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A Tale of Two Initiatives: Where Propaganda 
Meets Fact in the Debate Over  
America’s Health Care 
 
Randolph I. Gordon1 and Brook Assefa2 
A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT   
The Institute of Medicine reports that as many as 98,000 Americans die 
each year from preventable medical mistakes.3  According to one recent 
commentator, medical care is the third leading cause of death in the United 
States,4 accounting for 225,000 deaths annually.  If the human cost of 
preventable medical mistakes were to be translated into airplane crashes, it 
would be the equivalent of a jumbo jet crashing somewhere in the country 
at least once a day, every day of the year, including weekends and holidays.  
Imagine that evidence showed that 5 percent of air traffic controllers were 
responsible for over 50 percent of these crashes (not true). Would you 
propose to fix the problem by cutting back on the rights of passengers?  The 
truth is that 5 percent of physicians are responsible for over 50 percent of 
the preventable medical mistakes that result in death.5  Do these deaths 
delimitate a “crisis” worthy of our attention?  If so, would your solution be 
to cut back on the rights of patients?  
I-330 says yes. I-336 says no. 
I. TWO CHOICES: ADDRESSING HEALTH CARE BY 
INITIATIVE 
A.  Washington State: Two Initiatives  
In the Fall of 2004, over 600,000 signatures were collected in a period of 
three months on two state-wide initiatives to the Washington State 
Legislature, I-3306 and I-336.7  The right of initiative has special standing in 
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Washington, and is preserved in the Washington State Constitution: “The 
first power reserved by the people is the initiative.”8  Each initiative had its 
own website and ardent supporters.9,10  Each initiative purported to address 
a “crisis” in health care, but neither could agree on the nature or existence 
of the “crisis” as defined by the other.  In its previous session, the 
Washington State Legislature failed in its effort to fashion its own third 
version.  Since neither initiative was adopted by the Legislature, both made 
their way onto the November 2005 ballot as initiatives to the people.  Thus, 
the stage was set for a titanic campaign of two initiatives, reflecting two 
completely different world views, and battling during an off-year election 
for the attention—and for the hearts and minds—of the electorate.  When 
the dust settled and the smoke cleared, campaign expenditures set new 
records: over $14 million was raised.  This “obliterated the watermarks left 
by money gushing into past campaigns.”11 
B. The Text of the Initiatives: A Summay 
The two initiatives are complex and not readily susceptible to 
abbreviation without doing violence to their meaning.  For the sake of 
orienting the reader, however, each may be summarized thus: I-330 sought 
to limit liability of health care providers and limit patient claims and 
recovery under the name “health care liability reform.”12  I-336 sought to 
prevent avoidable health care injuries and increase the transparency of the 
insurance rate-setting process by capping insurance premium increases, 
increasing transparency of settlements, and increasing consumer 
representation on the Medical Quality Assurance Commission, under the 
slogan “better, safer health care.”13 
C. The Background of a Modern Tug-of-War  
The current national and local movement to change the civil justice 
system has a long pedigree.  During the last thirty years, there have been 
numerous state-based efforts in California, Florida, and Texas primarily 
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focused on limiting jury awards of damages with so-called “caps.”14  Since 
2000, under the Bush administration, the national malpractice debate has 
increasingly focused upon proposals to change the civil justice system, 
particularly with respect to handling of liability for injuries arising from the 
provision of medical care.   
President George W. Bush’s federal medical malpractice “reform”15 
efforts have had a significant impact on the nature of recent state-based 
efforts.  For example, I-330 expressly anticipates federal malpractice 
legislation as a fallback position “in the event that the Washington State 
Supreme Court . . . rules or affirms that section 2 of this act is 
unconstitutional.”16   
Characterizing the issue as a struggle between health care providers and 
lawyers misses the impact on patients, patients’ relatives, and the rights of 
the citizenry.  In fact, the caps on insurance rate increases proposed by I-
336 would largely benefit doctors.  The fact that the Washington State 
Nurses Association endorsed the “No on 330” campaign17 necessarily 
confutes such a simplistic dichotomy.  Enactment of the initiatives would 
have broad impacts on the quality of medical care, the ability to get redress 
for damages, and such constitutional principles18 as due process, equal 
protection, the right to a jury trial, as well as altering the traditional balance 
of burdens and incentives within tort law.19  
Furthermore, the oversimplified tale of doctors versus lawyers obscures 
the underlying tug-of-war between unorganized victims (patients) and 
organized defendants (business interests).  The costs of accidents are 
allocated between plaintiff-victims and defendant-tortfeasors in judicial 
proceedings:  “When judge and jury . . . choose damage-suit winners, they 
necessarily exercise discretionary government power.” 20  But in many areas 
where “courts expanded liability to unorganized victims . . . organized 
defendants persuade[d] legislatures to curtail it.”21  As such, both initiatives 
to the legislature are just one more attempt by organized parties to influence 
the legislature, and through legislation, the courts. 
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This article unfolds a tale of two initiatives in an historical context in 
which I-330 is not only embedded in the liability “reform” movement in 
particular, but also challenges the use of litigation as a vehicle of social 
change in general.  The tale plays out in a political realm where the 
relationship between ends and means is particularly tortuous.  While I-330 
and I-336 both claim to improve the health care system for health care 
providers and for patients, each articulates incompatible world views.  I-330  
exaggerates the extent of litigation abuse afflicting good doctors and the 
extent to which liability payouts drive insurance rate increases, addressing 
both by punishing innocent patients victimized by bad doctors.22  I-336 
defines a real problem with insurance gouging good doctors while bad 
doctors go unregulated, which it solves by stricter regulation of both 
insurers and offending doctors.23  While both initiatives engage public 
interest by tapping into growing dissatisfaction with delivery of health care 
in America, neither initiative offers the sort of fundamental changes 
required to effect a cure as to what ails the system.  In view of the 
conclusion by the authors that initiatives are a poor way of setting out 
complex changes to public policy, we suggest the public would be well-
served by increased judicial vigilance and legislative guidance respecting 
the “one subject” limitation on ballot initiatives established under the 
Washington State Constitution.24 
The threshold question is which initiative does a better job at addressing 
health care availability, affordability, and quality without violating 
constitutional principles or long-standing tort remedies for civil wrongs?  I-
330, on its face, concerns itself with availability and affordability of 
medical care, both of which properly may be conflated into the shorthand 
term “access,” based upon what the authors believe to be a demonstrably 
false or unsupportable premise that access is adversely affected by liability 
suits.  I-336 focuses primarily upon quality of medical care and directly 
addresses insurance rate spikes which I-330 misattributes to liability 
payouts. 
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The answer is that I-336 is better on both counts in that it begins the 
process of identifying and addressing real issues facing delivery of health 
care25 without burdening innocent victims.  I-330, on our review, 
encapsulates much that is wrong with the liability “reform” movement.  The 
most troublesome aspects of I-330 appear to flow from a misdiagnosis of 
the problem and its prescription of a medicine inimical to civil justice, the 
sale of which inures to the benefit of the insurance industry.26   
A survey of the scope of that problem is examined below. 
II. ASSAULT ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
MASQUERADING AS “REFORM”: HEALTH CARE, LAW, AND 
POLITICS 
The malpractice “reform” debate ostensibly concerns what has been 
termed a health care “crisis.”  Yet, in the public debate respecting I-330, 
surprisingly little was actually said about problems facing the provision of 
health care.  Thus, we begin our discussion with a very brief review of one 
of the greatest challenges currently facing American society for, in words 
widely attributed to Martin Luther King, Jr.: “Of all the forms of inequality, 
injustice in health care is the most shocking and inhumane.” 
A.  A Very Brief Summary of the State of Health Care in America   
Approximately 45 million Americans, or 15.6 percent of the population, 
lacked health insurance coverage in 2003. 27 The data is specific: uninsured 
children in 2003 numbered 8.4 million (11.4 percent of all children); young 
adults, those eighteen- to twenty-four-years old, were least likely of any age 
group to have health insurance in 2003 (30.2 percent).  Based on a three 
year average, people of Hispanic origin were the least likely to have health 
insurance, with an average of 32.8 percent lacking health insurance. 28  
Lack of insurance compromises the health of the uninsured because they 
receive less preventive care, are diagnosed at more advanced disease stages, 
and, once diagnosed, tend to receive less therapeutic care and have higher 
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mortality rates than the insured.29  About 20 percent of the uninsured, 
compared to 3 percent of those with coverage, say their usual source of care 
is the emergency room.30  
The United States spends nearly $100 billion per year to provide 
uninsured residents with health services, often for preventable diseases or 
diseases that physicians could treat more efficiently with earlier diagnosis.31  
The uninsured are 30 to 50 percent more likely to be hospitalized for an 
avoidable condition, with the average cost of an avoidable hospital stay 
estimated to be about $3,300.32  The increasing reliance of the uninsured on 
the emergency department has serious economic implications, since the cost 
of treating patients is higher in the emergency department than in other 
outpatient clinics and medical practices.33  The high proportion of uninsured 
in the United States contributes to health care costs because preventable 
conditions, or conditions which could have responded to inexpensive 
treatment at earlier stages, develop into health crises treated by more 
expensive emergency room care.34  The human toll is enormous.  Studies 
estimate that the number of excess deaths among uninsured adults age 
twenty-five to sixty-four is in the range of 18,000 a year.35   The American 
College of Physicians-American Society of Internal Medicine stated that: 
“People without health insurance tend to live sicker and die younger than 
people with health insurance.”36   
In 1998, the United States had the most expensive health care system in 
the world, costing $4,178 per capita, which is twice the median expended 
by the twenty-nine nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development.37  Yet, in 1996, the United States ranked twenty-sixth 
among industrialized countries for infant mortality rates.38 
B. The American Medical Association’s Narrative   
In the face of the gathering crises summarized above, it is no small 
source of wonder that the modern debate respecting health care reform so 
often devolves into arguments concerning medical liability and changes in 
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the civil justice system administering tort law.  Yet, as its starting point in 
addressing issues respecting access to improved health care, the American 
Medical Association (“AMA”) adopts, advances, and adverts to a narrative 
perpetuated at the highest levels of government:  “In his State of the Union 
Address last month, President Bush stressed that we all are threatened by a 
legal system that is out of control.”39  This claim persists despite studies 
independently confirming that instances of substandard health care outstrip 
legal claims by between five and ten to one.40  Judge Richard Posner cites 
the “incentive to sue [as] essential to the maintenance of the tort system as 
an effective, credible deterrent to negligence.”41  If, in fact, incidents of 
medical negligence outstrip legal claims, then weakening deterrence by 
burdening plaintiffs’ incentives and ability to sue would likely exacerbate 
the problems of medical quality.  Plaintiffs’ incentive to sue is vitiated if the 
incentive does not apply to plaintiffs’ lawyers, as reducing the availability 
of counsel imposes additional challenges to plaintiffs’ prosecution of their 
claims.  The entire framework of contingent fees is structured to align the 
incentives of lawyers with those of clients.  Thus, when I-330 seeks to 
amend RCW 7.70.070 to limit attorneys’ fees irrespective of damages and 
the costs incurred to prove the claim,42 an essential component of the tort 
system—the incentive to sue—is being undermined with a concomitant 
weakening of the tort system’s capacity to deter negligence.  
I-330’s attack on the incentive to sue is a direct assault on both historic 
tort notions of compensation and deterrence and the perceived power of the 
plaintiffs’ bar.  As such, the tale of two initiatives occurs at the juncture of a 
number of historic trends: the ebb and flow of power between plaintiffs and 
defendants; the continual rebalancing of deterrence and compensation 
offered by the tort system; the instrumentalist notion that positive social 
change can be effected through litigation;43 and the increased association of 
actors to the debate with opposing political parties.  All these trends conjoin 
in a political landscape near one of its most intractable features, health care 
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reform. Clearly, “The stakes are higher: first medical malpractice, then 
product liability, and . . . the entire universe of tort law.”44   
C. Brown’s Precedent of Litigation as a Vindication of Individual Rights    
Brown v. Board of Education and “[t]he civil rights movement is, in 
many ways, the crucible in which modern public interest law was forged.”45  
Brown revivified the belief in law as a means of remedying social ills and 
effecting social change, advancing the general principle of “litigation as a 
path to the vindication of [individual] rights.”46 This, in turn, led to a 
stronger, more vibrant, and increasingly specialized plaintiffs’ bar,47 and to 
the rise of firms that “solicit[ed] clients who had suffered special kinds of 
harms”48 such as medical negligence and toxic exposures.  The demands of 
social justice in this modern age present new challenges and place new 
burdens upon those seeking recovery for injuries.  
[T]he burden, however onerous, of establishing causation 
traditionally falls upon the plaintiff.  For an injured worker, 
establishing a causal relationship between exposure to a novel 
chemical formulation and specific symptoms may constitute an 
insurmountable burden . . . .  Poorly funded (often unemployed), 
sick, and desperate workers suffering an occupational disease 
resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals in the workplace often 
are asked to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence (or 
more), the toxicity of chemicals whose effects have yet to be 
explored by the combined resources of industry, employer, or 
government agency, or to be generally recognized by the medical 
community.49   
To be sure, some specializations looked more for “profitable practice 
rather than a new vision of social justice.”50  Nonetheless, the success of the 
plaintiffs’ bar in cases advancing individual interests against corporate and 
governmental power and the resultant alignment of the plaintiffs’ bar with 
the Democratic Party,51 led inexorably to political attacks upon trial lawyers 
representing plaintiffs.52  On one side, Senator Jim Bunning (a Republican 
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from Kentucky) called for senators to “take a stand . . . [either with] the 
mothers and the children or with the personal injury lawyers.”53  On the 
other side, Senator Patrick Leahy (a Democrat from Vermont) stated, 
“[i]nstead of looking at ways to reduce medical errors so that there would 
be fewer lawsuits, [they want] ‘to help these big insurance companies.’”54   
In this debate, Republican partisans can attack the civil justice system on 
both federal and state levels by appealing to a superficial populism critical 
both of unelected federal court judges and largely mythical runaway 
juries.55  The political treasure trove to be won by successful advocacy for 
“tort reform” is plain: successful limitations on liability help insulate 
Republican Party loyalists and corporate supporters from liability while 
simultaneously attacking the financial wherewithal of one of the major 
contributors to the Democratic Party, members of the plaintiffs’ bar.  At the 
least, initiatives like I-330 require a massive diversion of financial resources 
by plaintiffs’ lawyers to defense of their livelihood and away from 
advancing Democratic Party candidates and causes. 
In a sense, Brown has defined both the legal and the political battlefield 
upon which I-330 and I-336 were fought.  Pre-Brown, “[f]ew would have 
thought of the courts or civil litigation as an agent of social change.”56  
Post-Brown, both at the state and federal levels, injured patients, their 
families and their advocates in the plaintiffs’ bar are being challenged 
through initiatives and legislation sponsored by the insurance industry.   
In this debate, it is worth acknowledging that the interests of doctors and 
lawyers in the ideal world are both aligned with those of the patient in the 
first instance.  The doctor seeks to promote the patient’s health and the 
lawyer seeks to protect the patient’s rights.  Once a medical malpractice 
action is filed as a result of a medical mistake, the lawyer’s and the patient’s 
interests are aligned while the doctor and the insurer assume an adversarial 
posture by virtue of their economic self-interest. 
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D. Unpacking “Reform”: Debunking Rationales Disconnected from Facts   
The political alignments surrounding issues of malpractice “reform,”  add 
more heat than light to the subject matter.  The presentation of the subject as 
being a contest between doctors and lawyers further fuels the opportunity 
for ill will, as both sides perceive their professional livelihood as being at 
stake.  With acknowledgment of the strength of convictions held, it is 
essential that one bring intellectual honesty and rigor to an analysis of 
public policy that too often springs from unstated axioms based upon urban 
legend.57 
The justifications for the “reforms” instantiated in I-330, address neither 
the actual causes of malpractice, nor the actual effects of malpractice 
litigation. Since a medical misdiagnosis58 leads to a wrong prescription,59 a 
high level overview of the major reasons for reform is warranted.   
III. ANALYZING 1-330: WHERE PROPAGANDA MEETS FACTS 
A. Our National Narrative and the Attack on Civil Justice  
On its face, the fact that medical errors account for 98,000 deaths per 
year60 would seem to be the natural place to begin our national discourse on 
health care. The national narrative, as the term “malpractice reform” 
suggests, starts from litigation.  In recent years, our national political debate 
on medical insurance and access to high quality health care has increasingly 
focused upon proposals to change the civil justice system, particularly with 
respect to the handling of liability for malpractice injuries.  An attack on 
traditional notions of civil justice is at the core of the drive for malpractice 
“reform.”  
President George W. Bush stated in his State of the Union Address on 
January 28, 2003: 
To improve our health care system, we must address one of the 
prime causes of higher cost, the constant threat that physicians and 
hospitals will be unfairly sued.  [Applause.]  Because of excessive 
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litigation, everybody pays more for health care, and many parts of 
America are losing fine doctors.  No one has ever been healed by a 
frivolous lawsuit.  I urge the Congress to pass medical liability 
reform. [Applause.]61 
In his 2004 State of the Union Address, the President stated: “To protect 
the doctor-patient relationship, and keep good doctors doing good work, we 
must eliminate wasteful and frivolous medical lawsuits.  [Applause.]”62  In 
his 2005 State of the Union Address, the President again sought to advance 
“medical liability reform” with the promise that it “will reduce health care 
costs and make sure patients have the doctors and care they need. 
[Applause.]”63  
Other statements abound,64 the thrust of which are to impute problems 
with the delivery of our health care to failings in the operation of our civil 
justice system. These national addresses to the American people and both 
houses of the Congress, however, are crafted, reviewed, and published in a 
manner that makes them among the most carefully scrutinized and least 
casual pronouncements of public policy.  Accordingly, it is not unfair to 
regard them as examples of viewpoints with substantial following within 
the current debate.  On the other hand, one ought not be surprised to find 
that the State of the Union Address is a rhetorical piece, rather than a 
detailed policy analysis.  After all, its effectiveness is measured, in large 
part, upon its ability to appeal to, evoke, and shape a common 
understanding already held by the general public. 
The address contains a number of factual assertions that are subject to 
testing.  Before proceeding to do so, however, it is worth spending a 
moment to justify the undertaking and to consider briefly how public 
opinion is formed and how we reason from facts.  This will be important so 
that a person can periodically check his or her internal resistance to various 
assertions made hereinafter and ask the question: What evidence have I 
relied upon in forming preconceived notions that make me resistant to this 
evidence?  
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B. Exposing a Malpractice Narrative Designed for Shaping Public Opinion 
Against the Civil Justice System   
Public education and mobilization of public opinion are tools of 
governance in a democratic society.  Where we encounter the systematic 
propagation of information reflecting the views and interests of those 
advocating a cause, we have by definition entered the realm of 
“propaganda.”  Propaganda has a negative connotation in that it implies the 
manipulation of public opinion by dishonest means, usually by perpetuation 
and repetition of falsehoods.65  The distinction between that which is termed 
“propaganda” and that which is termed “public information” necessarily 
arises from an assessment by a hypothetical neutral of the veracity of the 
statements made and the ulterior motives of those disseminating the 
propositions at issue. 
The preeminent Scottish philosopher, David Hume, recognized the 
significance of public opinion as the sole support of government: 
NOTHING appears more surprizing to those, who consider human 
affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the 
many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, with 
which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of 
their rulers. When we enquire by what means this wonder is 
effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the 
governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. 
It is therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and 
this maxim extends to the most despotic and most military 
governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.66   
Noam Chomsky concluded in his 1984 essay, “The Manufacture of 
Consent”: “Propaganda is to democracy what violence is to 
totalitarianism.”67  The reason tartly stated by Chomsky: “A despotic state 
can control its domestic enemy by force, but as the state loses this weapon, 
other devices are required to prevent the ignorant masses from interfering 
with public affairs, which are none of their business.”68  It has recently 
come to be in vogue to speak of “framing” the issues, because members of 
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the public approach each issue with a neurologically instantiated frame of 
reference which makes them more or less likely to be receptive to the data 
presented.69    
Hume wrestled with the problem of inductive reasoning,70 by which we 
reach general conclusions about the future based on a series of observations 
about the past, noting that someone who insisted on sound deductive 
justifications for everything would starve to death. When we are less 
receptive to certain data due to preconceived notions, any inductive 
processes will necessarily display a bias.  Hence, propaganda functions not 
only as a tool of persuasion for the proposition presented, but as a pervasive 
influence tending to make us less receptive to contrary data by helping to 
shape our preconceptions or belief systems.  It becomes all the more 
important, then, to remain aware of urban legends perpetuated respecting 
the operation of the civil justice system, legends which often demean the 
jury system by suggesting irresponsible verdicts.71 
C. Testing Urban Legends Underlying Proposals for Medical Liability 
“Reform”   
It is time to consider the propositions repeatedly put forward by President 
George W. Bush in his State of the Union addresses.  In doing so, we must 
keep in mind that the mere fact that these remarks meet with public 
acclamation may only mean that they are resonating with some pre-existing 
belief system or even that their repetition has created its own resonance.  
Since that belief system may have been fortified or even created by 
propaganda, the veracity of the propositions cannot be judged by “common 
sense.”  
The following propositions were put forward by or may be inferred from 
the State of the Union Addresses cited above: 
1.  Health care litigation is unfair, excessive, and frivolous. 
2.  One of the prime causes of higher health care costs is litigation. 
3.  Many parts of America are losing doctors due to litigation. 
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4.  Medical liability “reform” will significantly reduce health care costs           
    and make sure patients have the doctors and care they need.72 
1. Is Health Care Litigation Unfair, Excessive, and Frivolous? 
a.  Is Health Care Litigation Unfair?   
Our current civil justice system provides for compensation for victims for 
the civil wrongs known as torts.  Such compensation is awarded based upon 
the injured party establishing that the defendant is “at fault.”73  In 
Washington State, claims for injuries arising from the provision of health 
care are governed by statute and the statute defines the elements of proof 
required.74 
The burden, both legal and practical, upon the injured party is greater in 
medical malpractice litigation than in, say, litigation arising from a car 
accident in a number of ways.  First, in medical malpractice cases, the 
statute of limitations runs even though a plaintiff is under eighteen; in the 
ordinary tort action, the statute of limitation is tolled during the injured 
party’s minority.75  Second, except in rare cases where the evidence of 
injury is observable by lay persons and able to be described without medical 
training, the breach of the standard of care must be established by a medical 
practitioner in the same field or specialty.76  Third, some collateral sources 
such as payments from other sources than the injured party or his or her 
immediate family may be considered as a way of offsetting damages due 
from the defendant; this is something not generally available in other tort 
claims.77  Fourth, the burden of proof rests with the injured party who must 
establish all of the elements of the claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.78  And lastly, no punitive damages are available in Washington on 
tort claims.79 
For the purposes of our discussion, let us envision the case of a child who 
has suffered hypoxic injury at time of birth due to a breach of the standard 
of care on the part of the doctor or nurse.  This injury, let us suppose, will 
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result in some form of brain damage and, as a consequence, moderate to 
severe impairment of speech, motor, and cognitive function, requiring 
assistance for the balance of the injured child’s life.  The traditional 
economic rationale for the tort system is that holding the negligent actor 
liable will both compensate the victim and provide incentives for improved 
safety.  The injured party, through his or her parents or guardian or personal 
representative,80 has the burden of establishing the liability of the physician 
by a preponderance of the evidence81 based upon a breach by the physician 
of the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent medical 
practitioner in Washington in the same field acting in the same or similar 
circumstances at the time of the care in question,82  as supported by expert 
witnesses deemed qualified by the court.83  Under Washington law, for civil 
trials with a jury of twelve, ten of the twelve jurors must concur on each 
element necessary to the verdict.84 
The unfortunate reality is that the plaintiffs in such a case approach 
litigation having already experienced a personally devastating experience 
and, more often than not, have suffered economic devastation as well.  It is 
now their task to seek compensation from a malpractice insurance company, 
a professional litigant with relatively unlimited resources.  In the absence of 
any cost-shifting based upon a juror determination of fault, the victim 
would presumably be left on their own with the entire burden being borne 
by the victim’s family—and the public.  No deterrence against carelessness 
or incentives for greater safety would be present in such a system.  In a 
system of absolute liability, all health care injuries would be covered by 
insurance, again with the cost spread among the general public, but no 
specific disincentive against future negligence by the at-fault party would 
necessarily inhere in such a system.  One is hard put to discern any 
unfairness to the defendant unique to health care litigation that justifies 
substantial change to our civil justice system so as to tilt the balance against 
the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant. 85  
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b.  Is Health Care Litigation Excessive?  
The assertion that there is “excessive” litigation appears untenable in the 
face of studies suggesting, to the contrary, that the vast majority of patients 
who sustain injuries from substandard medical care pursue no legal action 
whatsoever.86  In Florida, hospital reporting of injuries resulting from 
“adverse incidents,”  “event[s] over which health care personnel could 
exercise control,” is required by statute.87  Florida hospitals reported over 
six times as many adverse incidents as medical malpractice claims during 
the period 1996-99.88  Instances of substandard care outstrip claims in Utah 
(ratio of 5.1 to 1), Colorado (ratio of 6.7 to 1), New York (ratio of 7.6 to 1) 
and California (ratio of 10.0 to 1).89   
Taken together, the data . . . suggest that the dysfunctional 
characteristics of the medical malpractice system--most notably, its 
adequacy and its accuracy--have a resilience over time and across 
jurisdictions... [O]ur findings certainly lend plausibility to the 
argument that the findings from Utah, Colorado, New York, and 
California are a reasonably [sic] reflection of the situation in other 
states.90 
To the extent that civil liability for avoidable medical mistakes promotes 
safety by requiring negligent providers to compensate victims, it cannot be 
concluded that the number of lawsuits is “excessive” given that between 80 
and 90 percent of injury claims are never filed.91  Moreover, recent studies 
report that while roughly 12 percent92 of those injured file a claim, “the 
number of medical malpractice cases being filed per capita has dropped 
over the last ten years.”93  For example, “[a]djusting for population growth, 
the number of payments per 100,000 people has fallen from 5.85 in 2001 to 
4.91 in 2004, a decline of 16.1 percent.”94   
Is litigation “excessive,” perhaps, in the indirect sense that fear of 
liability on the part of physicians encourages unnecessary medical tests and 
procedures referred to as “defensive medicine?”  Even in this attenuated 
sense, apparently not. The United States General Accounting Office, relying 
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upon a 2003 study of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), was unable 
to find “savings” from a reduction in “defensive medicine” stating: 
“[P]reliminary findings from a 2003 study [by CBO] . . . failed to find any 
impact of state tort laws on medical spending.”95   
Furthermore, in connection with the enactment by the House of 
Representatives of a bill seeking to limit patients’ recovery of damages, the 
CBO was requested to calculate savings from reduced spending on 
“defensive medicine.”  The CBO stated: 
CBO’s estimate does not include savings from reductions in the 
practice of defensive medicine—services and procedures that are 
provided largely or entirely to avoid potential liability.  Estimating 
the amount of health care spending attributable to defensive 
medicine is difficult.  Most estimates are speculative in nature, 
relying, for the most part, on surveys of physicians’ responses to 
hypothetical clinical situations, and clinical studies of the 
effectiveness of certain intensive treatments.  Compounding the 
uncertainty about the magnitude of spending for defensive 
medicine, there is little empirical evidence on the effect of medical 
malpractice tort controls on spending for defensive medicine and, 
more generally, on overall health care spending. . . . CBO could 
find no statistically significant difference in per capita health care 
spending between states with and without malpractice tort limits.  
These findings are preliminary, however, and CBO continues to 
explore this issue.96  
Lastly, litigation is also not “excessive” in terms of malpractice payouts 
to resolve claims.  On the contrary, the rate of increase in malpractice 
payouts has been miniscule for over a decade.  Adjusted for inflation, 
between 1991 and 2004, such payouts had a negligible rise: from $2.1 to 
$2.3 billion or only 0.8 percent per annum.97  Over the same period, the 
inflation-adjusted median payment from jury verdicts rose only 1.2 percent 
per annum98 while verdicts for more than $1 million declined by 31 percent 
during the period 2001-04.99 The percentage of paid claims over $1 million 
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declined from 1.8 percent to 1.6 percent from FY 1996–2000 when 
compared to FY 2001–2005.100 
It is worth noting at this point that in Washington, while the population 
has grown at a rate of 1.7 percent a year from 1994 to 2002, the number of 
malpractice suits filed has only grown at .4 percent per year during that 
same period.101  Moreover, when inflation is taken into account, the average 
amount of a malpractice payout per doctor in 2001 declined 32.3 percent 
from 1997 to 2001, from $4,525 per doctor to $3,065.102  It may be 
concluded that whatever urgency is driving the current initiatives to change 
the civil justice system, it is neither an increase in the number of lawsuits or 
the amounts paid out, both of which have been trending lower in recent 
years.103 
c.  Is Health Care Litigation Frivolous?  
To conclude our review of the triad of criticisms leveled by President 
Bush (unfair, excessive, frivolous), we must consider whether the current 
system of liability for medical malpractice encourages frivolous litigation.  
At the outset, it should be noted that lawyers representing plaintiffs injured 
as a consequence of medical malpractice are generally compensated on a 
contingent fee basis, with legal fees being paid as a percentage of the 
recovery, if any.  Defense lawyers, representing the malpractice defendant, 
are generally compensated on an hourly basis by the insurance company for 
the defendant health care provider.  One would not expect plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, who only receive a fee if there is a settlement or verdict in favor 
of their injured client, to pursue cases lacking merit.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys, as 
a rule, must incur substantial expenses obtaining copies of a patient’s 
medical records, paying for record review by medically trained individuals, 
and retaining expert witnesses (customarily out-of-state) to render opinions 
respecting the standard of care.104  In addition, such cases involve the 
expense of compensating the defense experts for their time during 
deposition.  Finally, there is the lost opportunity cost associated with the 
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pursuit of a frivolous case, when other meritorious cases are not pursued.  
There is nothing in the economics of attorney compensation through a 
contingent fee that militates in favor of the commencement of non-
meritorious claims or the prolongation of litigation.105 
One Ohio State University study concludes that: “It appears that 
malpractice defendants—rather than plaintiffs—may be somewhat too 
inclined to resist settlement and push cases to trial.”106  Comparing the 
outcomes of trials following settlement negotiations in both medical 
malpractice and product liability cases, the study found that defense 
attorneys in product liability cases correctly rejected plaintiff demands that 
exceeded the eventual jury verdict twelve out of fourteen times; on the other 
hand, defense lawyers in medical malpractice cases only made the correct 
settlement decision in eight out of seventeen cases, more often than not 
going to trial despite the fact that the jury ultimately awarded more in 
damages than plaintiffs had been willing to accept in settlement.107  This 
data tends to refute the notion of litigious plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to play 
the civil jury “lottery.”  It does support the notion that physician-defendants, 
driven by an emotional desire to defend their reputation in a medical 
malpractice suit, may not be best situated to enter into the sorts of 
negotiations reasonably calculated to lead to rational compromise 
settlements.  
Moreover, malpractice lawsuits are anything but “jackpot justice.”108  
First, the inflation-adjusted median size of judgments has changed little: it 
grew from $125,000 to $146,100 at an average per annum increase of just 
1.2 percent.109  In Washington, for example, the dollar value of malpractice 
payouts decreased 25.7 percent110 between 1997 and 2001—hardly an 
indicator of our state’s “jackpot justice.”  Second, “the proportion of 
payments of $1 million or more, adjusted for inflation, is down 56 percent 
 . . . from 2.25 percent of all payments to just 1 percent of all payments.”111  
Lastly, and most importantly, between 2001 and 2004, the annual number 
of malpractice payments has fallen 13.6 percent from 16,682 to 14,441—a  
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number “only 5.5 percent higher than the 13,687 payments recorded for 
1991.”112  In summary, the data shows that malpractice suits are not a 
territory for frivolous lawsuits to begin with, and in more recent years, are 
increasingly favoring defendants over plaintiffs.113 
Beyond the rhetorical charge against trial lawyers (which presupposes the 
ineffectiveness of the ethical and procedural safeguards of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and Civil Rules), the “frivolousness” argument strikes 
at the heart of the rationality of the jury system.  Jury decisions, however, if 
biased at all, are biased in favor of medical doctors.114  “Defendants with an 
M.D. degree appeared to win medical malpractice trials more often than 
health care workers who lacked that degree, even when . . . controlled for 
injury severity and type of alleged malpractice.”115  Merritt & Barry report 
that their “findings are consistent with a plethora of other studies 
concluding that civil juries are conscientious in their work and reach 
rational decisions.”116  The evidence supports the contention that juries are 
more conservative than judges, physicians, or lawyers in their assessments 
of personal injury cases.117   
Against this factual background, the polemics of health care litigation as 
unfair, excessive, and frivolous appear unfounded.  Rather, “In the face of 
this evidence, exaggerated anecdotes and wild stories no longer have a place 
in responsible review of the tort process.”118  
2. Is Litigation One of the Prime Causes of Higher Health Care Costs?  
Proponents of medical liability “reform” contend that a prime cause of 
rising health costs is medical malpractice litigation.  One could think this to 
be true as “[m]any medical errors are occurring.”119  The 2000 Institute of 
Medicine report found that preventable medical errors are the cause of up to 
98,000 deaths per year in the nation’s hospitals.120  Additionally, a 2002 
Commonwealth Fund report confirmed these statistics and “estimated that 
22.8 million people have experienced a major medical error, either 
personally or through at least one family member, at an annual cost of USD 
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$17 to $29 billion.”121  “The United States Agency for Health care Research 
and Quality (AHRQ) estimates that medical errors are the eighth [sic] 
leading cause of death, which is higher than . . . cancer.”122  If we include 
some 106,000 deaths from adverse effects of medications (in the absence of 
negligent prescription and administration), deaths related to health care total 
some 225,000 Americans annually, making it the third leading cause of 
death.123  
Surprising as it may seem, medical errors do not drive malpractice 
premiums.  “[M]alpractice premiums are not really experience rated, i.e., 
they are not based on past malpractice claims.  As a result, negligent and 
non-negligent physicians pay similar premiums.”124  Therefore, whether the 
insurance crisis is due to medical errors, “the level of damages themselves, 
or alternatively, some aspect of the insurance system”125 is an open 
question.  Ironically, I-336, opposed by the Washington State Medical 
Association, proposed a fix that would support non-negligent physicians: a 
rating plan mandating consideration of past loss experience of facilities or 
individual physicians. 126 
In 2005, the AMA “reported that twenty states are experiencing a ‘full-
blown medical liability crisis’ due to sharply increasing medical malpractice 
insurance premiums.”127 “Many physicians have experienced exorbitant 
medical malpractice liability insurance premium increases, oftentimes as 
high as 100 percent or even 200 percent over the previous year.”128  A 2003 
AMA study reported “92.4 percent of high-risk specialists said that liability 
pressures were important in their decision to stop providing certain 
services.”129  In short, according to the AMA, the liability insurance rate 
crisis has reached epic proportions. 
Significantly, a causal relationship between litigation payouts and 
insurance rate increases has not been firmly established.  To the contrary, 
studies by the CBO, the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and 
other leading analysts show neither medical errors nor litigation costs to be 
the dominant drivers of malpractice premiums. The GAO noted at least 
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three factors affecting malpractice premiums including: “(1) decreases in 
investment income as interest rate from bonds decreased; (2) competition 
for market shares . . . ; and (3) [increases in] reinsurance rates.”130  The 
CBO also cited, inter alia, (1) increased cost of malpractice claims; (2) 
reduced investment income; (3) reinsurance costs; (4) short term 
adjustments in reserve levels; as well as, (5) reductions in the supply of 
malpractice insurance carriers.131  Commentators and analysts agree that the 
six significant factors include: “(1) medical cost inflation; (2) the cyclical 
nature of the insurance market; (3) the need to shore up reserves for policies 
in force; (4) a decline in investment income; (5) overall financial safety 
considerations; and (6) the supply and demand of coverage.”132  
An aggregation of the above factors would find market forces (factors 1, 
2, 4, and 6) and insurance business decisions (factors 3, 4, and 5) to be the 
progenitors of the liability insurance crisis. According to its analysis of the 
business cycle as it relates to insurance premiums, Weiss Ratings, Inc.133 
concludes: “The property and casualty industry suffered a twelve-year 
“soft” period through 1999, during which marketing goals often superceded 
prudent underwriting practices and decision-makers typically relied too 
heavily on high investment income to make up for losing operations. In an 
attempt to catch up, insurers have tightened underwriting standards and 
raised premiums.”134  In short, insurers raised premiums to cover losses in 
the stock market, not because of runaway litigation. 
Medical malpractice premiums are a minute part of overall health care 
costs, and it appears an open secret that litigation settlements and awards 
amount to less than 1 percent of the costs of health care.  In January 2004, 
the National Health Statistics Group’s Office of the Actuary for the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services released its report showing a 9.3 
percent increase in health care expenditures in 2002 to $1.6 trillion.135  
Malpractice payouts by physicians and their insurers were a mere $4.5 
billion in 2001—less than 1 percent of the country’s overall health care 
costs that year of about $1.4 trillion.136 
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The CBO came to a similar conclusion that malpractice costs account for 
less than 2 percent of health care spending—private or governmental.137  
Therefore, even if malpractice “reform” lowered payouts by an estimated 
“average of 25 percent to 30 percent from the levels likely to occur under 
current law”, it would “lower health care costs by only about 0.4 percent to 
0.5 percent, and the likely effect on health care insurance premiums would 
be comparably small.”138 
For example, GE Medical Protective, the nation’s largest medical 
malpractice insurer, sought a premium rate increase of 19 percent a mere six 
months after Texas lawmakers enacted caps on non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice awards.  In a regulatory filing with the Texas 
Department of Insurance, seeking to justify the rate increase in the face of a 
recent cap on damages, GE Medical Protective admitted that capping non-
economic damages would show loss savings of only 1.0 percent.139  In 
Washington State, Physicians Insurance, the largest writer of medical 
malpractice insurance for physicians and surgeons in Washington, was 
required by the Washington State Insurance Commissioner to refund more 
than $1.3 million in premiums to Washington physicians associated with 
unfiled and unjustified rate hikes.140  In view of the reduced number of 
claims per capita and lower payouts already noted, it would appear that 
insurance premium increases do not correlate with malpractice awards, and 
therefore, cannot be linked to malpractice litigation costs. 
On the contrary, if any of the cost is attributed to litigation, it is likely 
that some of it is due to the strategies employed by defense attorneys and 
insurance firms.  Consider, for example, The Doctors Company, a 
physician-owned insurance company.  It markets its coverage on-line based 
upon aggressive defense of its insured doctor’s reputations stating: 
Over and over, our approach has not only saved millions of dollars 
in potential settlements, but has also preserved the well-earned 
good reputations of countless doctors. 
 Millions for defense. Not a penny in tribute.141 
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 No malpractice claim is settled without your written permission.142  
 America’s Doctors are Under Assault.143 
It is hardly surprising to discover that costs of litigation go up when the 
settlement decision is turned over to a party who has been informed that 
accountability for avoidable medical mistakes is a matter of personal honor 
and reputation.  According to The Doctors Company, although the average 
medical malpractice insurer spends thirty-two cents of every premium 
dollar on defense costs, it markets itself with the claim that it spends 49 
percent of its premiums on defense costs.144  If either of The Doctors’ 
Company claims is true, they bode ill for the industry, as well as the 
company itself. 
In the State of Washington Office of Insurance Commissioner Medical 
Malpractice Closed Claim Study released in October 2005, Commissioner 
Kreidler updated and compared his findings from the previous report 
published the previous February.145 What clearly emerges is a relatively 
stable history of malpractice litigation in which increases in Defense and 
Cost Containment (DCC) expenses significantly outstrip the indemnity paid 
to plaintiffs.  This is highly significant, not least of all, because DCC costs 
(including defense attorneys’ fees above deductibles) are borne directly by 
the insurance companies while plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees are generally paid 
on a contingent basis from the compensation awarded to the plaintiff.   
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We see in these figures more justification for limiting defense attorneys’ 
fees than for limiting plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, usually 
paid on a contingent fee as a percentage of the award or settlement, would 
only have seen their fees rise at the rate that the indemnity awards rose, by 
any measure at a rate of increase substantially less than the rate of DCC cost 
increase and under half the rate of increase for DCC for the ten year period 
ending June 30, 2005.  Moreover, the increases in paid indemnity to 
plaintiffs are modest: 3.5 percent without consideration of either the rate of 
population growth (1.7 percent annually)[see  text accompanying footnote 
157-159 infra] or inflation, both of which would create a structural increase 
in apparent payouts.  Moreover, inflationary increases tending to increase 
the dollar amount (but not the value) of paid indemnity to plaintiffs are 
offset by correspondingly higher investment returns earned by insurance 
companies on premium dollars collected. 
Ironically, it is higher health care costs that tend to drive medical 
malpractice payouts higher—not the reverse—since one of the principal 
elements of damages in any award for seriously injured individuals is the 
cost of ongoing or anticipated medical care.  In the cases of individuals in a 
persistent vegetative state or with quadriplegia, the expense of past and 
ongoing health care needs can constitute the largest share of damages. 
Lastly, it is worth repeating that only a relatively small percentage of 
claims filed ultimately go to trial.146  In Washington “[o]f the 10,212 closed 
claims [over a period of the preceding ten years], forty-five claims—or less 
than one percent—were decided by a jury and resulted in a payment to a 
plaintiff.”147  
Of the claims that do proceed to trial, those that result in a defense verdict 
are not necessarily wholly lacking in merit.  Researchers at the American 
Society of Anesthesiologists arranged for pairs of doctors to review 103 
randomly selected medical negligence claims and found that the pairs 
agreed in 62 percent of the cases and disagreed in 38 percent of the cases 
respecting the appropriateness of care.  They concluded: “These 
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observations indicate that neutral experts . . . commonly disagree in their 
assessment when using the accepted standard of reasonable and prudent 
care.” 148 
3. Are Many Parts of America Losing Doctors Due to Litigation?  
Is America losing doctors due to litigation?  The simple answer is no.  It 
is axiomatic that the supply and demand of doctors is not regulated by 
litigation but by personal and economic factors.  For instance, “[rural areas] 
often have difficulty attracting or retaining other professionals.”149  Even 
the Council on Graduate Medical Education has stated, “The relative 
shortage of health professionals in rural areas of the United States is one of 
the few constants in any description of the United States medical care 
system.”150  Moreover, this problem predates the so-called litigation crisis.  
“Rural health care shortages occur throughout the world, including places 
where . . . nothing like the U.S. civil justice system [is] in place.”151 
Furthermore, the GAO investigated allegations that five states, Florida, 
Mississippi, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, faced a “crisis” in 
medical care.  Supposedly, rising medical malpractice insurance premiums 
were driving doctors out of practice or out of the state resulting in a critical 
shortage of doctors affecting consumer access to health care. 152  However, 
the GAO concluded: 
In the five states with reported problems . . . we determined that 
many of the reported provider actions taken in response to 
malpractice pressures were not substantiated or did not widely 
affect access to health care.  For example, some reports of 
physicians relocating to other states, retiring, or closing practices 
were not accurate or involved relatively few physicians.153 
In Florida, for instance, the GAO investigators noted:  
[Reports of physicians departing the practice] were anecdotal, not 
extensive and in some cases . . . inaccurate.154  For example, state 
medical society officials told us that Collier and Lee counties lost 
all of their neurosurgeons due to malpractice concerns; however, 
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we found at least five neurosurgeons currently practicing in each 
county as of April 2003. . . .  [O]ver the past two years the number 
of new medical licenses issued has increased and physicians per 
capita has remained unchanged.155 
Here in Washington, an investigation by the Seattle Times revealed that, 
contrary to various advertising campaigns, no medical clinics had been 
“mothballed” and that doctors were flowing into the state faster than they 
were departing: 
 
Full-page newspaper ads say that high malpractice jury awards . . . 
have driven hundreds of doctors from the state, thousands from 
“states like Washington.”  “As a sad result,” the ads say, 
emergency rooms are “mothballed,” trauma centers “shuttered,” 
maternity wards “shut down,” and neighborhood clinics closed  
. . . .  
 . . . No emergency rooms or trauma centers in Washington state 
have been ‘shuttered’ or ‘mothballed,’” said Cassie Sauer, 
spokeswoman for the Washington State Hospital Association. . . .   
Doctors are leaving the state, but others are coming in.  Tom 
Curry, executive director of the state medical association, the 
source for a Doctors for Medical Liability Reform claim that 500 
doctors have left Washington since 1998, said the association 
doesn’t know how many doctors had come into the state during 
that period, or how that figure compares to doctor drain in previous 
five-year periods.  
According to a 2003 U.S. General Accounting Office report, 
“Physician Workforce,” there were more doctors per capita in 2001 
than there were in 1991 in all of Washington’s metropolitan areas 
and in the aggregate of rural areas as well . . . .”  Kemp, of Doctors 
for Medical Liability Reform, said the ad refers to specialists.  The 
GAO report said the number of specialists also increased per capita 
in both metro and rural areas.” 156 
Lastly, Public Citizen also stated “far from an exodus of doctors—
Washington continues to experience a steady and significant increase in the 
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number of doctors.”157  According to Public Citizen, based on private 
communications with the Washington Medical Quality Assurance 
Commission, “the number of in-state practicing doctors in Washington has 
jumped 3,720 [physicians] over the last decade, from 15,533 in 1993 to 
19,253 in 2003[,] [which] is an overall increase of 23.9 percent or 2.4 
percent a year.”158  In the same period, “Washington’s overall population 
experienced an annual average increase of 1.7 percent from 1993 to 2002.  
This means the number of doctors increased at a rate 37.3 percent faster 
than the rate of population increase during this period.”159  The bottom line 
is that a shortage of doctors, to the extent that it exists, is getting better and 
not worse. 
4. Will Medical Liability “Reform” Significantly Reduce Health Care 
Costs and Make Sure Patients Have the Doctors and Care They Need? 
a.  General Response: Proposed “Reform” Will Have a Negligible Impact 
While this question has been previously addressed from a number of 
facets previously, we will only recap the essential points:  liability payouts 
for medical malpractice are a relatively small contributor to health care 
costs and are not a primary factor in the availability of health care.  Since its 
contribution to the purported problem is small, it follows that the impact of 
any “reform” is small.  The sensitivity of total health care costs to changes 
in malpractice liability is negligible.160  This is confirmed by the 2004 CBO 
report which stated that “restrictions on malpractice liability . . . do not 
affect economic efficiency: they modify the distribution of gains and losses 
to individuals and groups but do not create benefits or costs for society as a 
whole.”161  The report concludes: 
 
In short, the evidence available to date does not make a strong case that 
restricting malpractice liability would have a significant effect, either 
positive or negative, on economic efficiency.  Thus, choices about 
specific proposals may hinge more on their implications for equity—in  
particular, on their effects on health care providers, patients injured 
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through malpractice, and users of the health care system in general.162 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
What the CBO suggests in the phrase “implications for equity” is the 
dark matter that is unseen but curves the legal landscape.163  Just as black 
holes bend space, changes to the tort law bend justice.  Changing 
longstanding equitable principles not only affects people’s legal rights, but 
blunts, often for generations, societal expectations for justice—and even the 
sense of injustice. Proposals for medical liability “reform” typically include 
a number of technical features designed to tilt the legal landscape in favor 
of defendants and against plaintiffs.  I-330 contained all the typical 
provisions, together with some additional features: reduction in the statute 
of limitations period for both adults and minors; relaxed rules for the 
admission of collateral source evidence (such as payments received by 
injured plaintiffs from disability insurance carriers for which they have paid 
premiums); a cap on non-economic damages; restrictions on the access to a 
trial by jury; limitations on contingent attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs; 
elimination of apparent agency liability for hospitals; requirement of 
structured settlements (stream of payments) for awards above $50,000; 
reversion of unpaid portion of the structure to the insurer/defendant in the 
event of the death of the judgment creditor (plaintiff).  All of these 
proposals are designed to deter the prosecution of cases, to limit parties 
from being held liable, or to reduce the number and size of awards or 
payouts to injured plaintiffs.   
b.  Ineffectiveness of Capping Jury Awards in Arresting Malpractice 
Insurance Premium Increases 
(i)  Overview 
What has been described as an insurance “crisis” or litigation “crisis” 
has, in the former case, been misattributed to a growth in malpractice 
payouts in civil trials and, in the latter case, simply does not exist as a prime 
factor in rate increases.  It would be surprising, therefore, if we were to 
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learn that limitations or “caps” on jury awards, a “cure” based upon the 
verity of the unsubstantiated propositions just debunked, actually worked.  
We are not surprised.  The evidence suggests that caps have little or no 
effect on malpractice premium rates.   
Efforts to limit or “cap” jury awards in several states, such as California, 
Florida, Maryland, and Ohio, which date as far back as the 1970s, have 
resulted in varied success in the courts and little success in the medical 
malpractice insurance business.  It is helpful to review the record of the last 
three decades. 
 (ii).  Thirty Years of Failed Results in Arresting Insurance Rates 
The nearly three-decade-old experience of states is quite telling.  In 
California, for example, “Conventional wisdom holds that . . . the [1975] 
MICRA164 cap is systematically reducing compensation and substantially 
reducing the damages paid by culpable defendants.”165  However, California 
and several other states that modeled their damage caps after MICRA have 
not seen a reduction in their rate of increases.  In the thirteen years after the 
MICRA $250,000 non-economic damage cap was enacted, “doctors’ 
malpractice insurance premiums rose by 450 percent.”166  Maryland, which 
enacted a $350,000 cap in 1986, saw premiums rise “by more than 70 
percent” in 2003-04.167  Doctors in Missouri, where a $350,000 cap was 
enacted in 1986, also saw their premiums rise by 121 percent in 2000-03.  
Recent experience with newly enacted caps is not different.  Oklahoma, 
which passed a cap in 2003, saw a 105 percent increase in 2004.168  The 
2003 caps imposed by Texas’ Proposition 12169 also failed to limit rate 
increases.  In fact, “Right after the referendum passed, major insurers 
requested rate hikes as high as 35 percent for doctors and 65 percent for 
hospitals.”170  To be sure, the GAO Report “could not determine the extent 
to which differences in premium rates and claim payments across states 
were attributed only to damage caps.”171  In short, “whether damage caps 
slow, or otherwise affect, [rate] increases remains unclear.”172 
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Moreover, there is no conclusive proof that the absence of damage caps is 
associated with increases in premiums.  Minnesota, for example, “has the 
lowest premiums and the mildest increases in premiums, but it has neither 
damages caps nor crisis.”173  Comparing Minnesota (a state without damage 
caps) with Florida (a state with damage caps), we see that between 1998 
and 2002, the Minnesota insurer increased its base premium rate by about 2 
percent in contrast to the Florida insurer that increased its base premium 
rate by about 98 percent.174 
Oddly enough, the evidence that caps and premiums are not strongly 
linked is not news to insurance companies.  In 2004, one insurance 
company reported to the Texas Department of Insurance that the state’s 
non-economic damage cap would be responsible for no more than a 1 
percent drop in losses.175  As recently as June 2005, an insurance executive 
was quoted stating “tort reform had little effect on medical malpractice 
premium rates.”176   
(iii) Crossover Effects of Non-Economic Caps and Other Confounding  
Factors  
The simplistic proposition that non-economic caps lower premiums is 
dubious based on the evidence.  It must be noted, however, that rigorous 
analysis is an undertaking that meets with many challenges, not the least of 
which is a sort of legal Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, whereby the 
observer effects the events observed.177  For instance, the very existence of 
caps may affect plaintiffs or their counsel with respect to the types of cases 
they will choose to pursue, litigation or settlement.  Second, it is unknown 
whether caps, when known to jurors, serve as a “floor” for severe injuries or 
death or as a “ceiling” for less severe injuries.  For example, a 2004 Rand 
Corporation study on California’s MICRA concluded: “It is not clear 
whether jurors, when [aware of caps], would be more likely to ‘self-limit’ 
their original awards to just $250,000 for non-economic damages or to 
inflate their awards . . . to make a public statement about their feelings.”178 
And finally, the crossover effect of caps, i.e., “where non-economic 
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damages are capped . . . some portion . . . might spill over into . . . unlimited 
economic damages,”179 is not fully understood.  In a nutshell, in considering 
the total compensation scheme, the flexibility inherent in calculation of non-
economic damages in response to caps is a complex phenomenon that 
requires further analysis before any conclusions can be drawn. 
Professor Catherine M. Sharkey’s paper, discussing the unintended 
consequences of medical malpractice damages, posits that “economic 
compensatory damages in medical malpractice cases might be much more 
malleable than its conventional depiction and might therefore be subject to 
inflation via a crossover function.”180  In other words, in the pursuit of 
justice, jurors may blur “what the law often treats as hermetically sealed 
categories of economic and non-economic damages.”181 
In Carter v. United States,182 Judge Richard Posner wrote, “[t]here might 
be harm . . . if for example a plaintiff had some leeway in classifying 
damages as economic rather than non-economic, or if knowledge that non-
economic damages were unavailable would have induced her to devote less 
effort to proving up such damages and more to proving her economic 
damages.”  Therefore, there seems to be some level of judicial recognition, 
if not acceptance, of the crossover effect. 
c.  Table Summarizing Impact of Proposed Changes  
None of the proposed changes provide any incentive for safer medical 
care by negligent physicians, as the table below demonstrates: 








(Minor) (I-330, §6) 
Minor patients under six 
or their custodians must 
file within three years or 
by age eight; limitations 
period not tolled during 
minority.  Cuts off 
claims without regard to 
merit; hard on minors 
and disempowered 
populations. 
No.  At fault party not 
held accountable based 
upon passage of time, 
not upon the merits.  





Patients or their 
custodians must file 
within one year of the 
time they discovered or 
reasonably should have 
discovered negligence; 
cuts off claims without 




No. At fault party not 
held accountable based 
upon passage of time, 
not upon the merits.  
Incentive for safety 
reduced. 
Requirement of 
Structured Payout  
(I-330, §10) 
Mandates time payments 
on jury awards in excess 
of $50,000, possibly 
over decades; delays 
receipt of funds and 
investment 
opportunities. 
No.  At fault party may 
have reduced expense 
related to purchase of 
structured payments.  
Incentive for safety may 
be reduced. 
 
A Tale of Two Initiatives 727 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
Proposed Change 
Impact on Injured Party Increased Safety 
Incentive 
Limit on 
Contingent Fee for 
Plaintiff (I-330, §4) 
Reduces incentive for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
undertake the 
representation on the 
contingent fee basis and 
may result in some cases 
not being pursued 
because not cost-
effective to do so. Limit 
on contingent fees will 
nearly always impair the 
ability of the injured 
party alone to obtain 
counsel as defendants’ 
counsel generally paid 
on hourly basis.  
No.  At fault party may 
escape liability because 
plaintiff is unable to 
obtain counsel or 
counsel has less 
incentive for vigorous 
prosecution of claim.  
Reduced incentive for 
safety. 
Ninety-Day Notice 
Period (I-330, §5) 
Creates new procedural 
hurdle; possible trap for 
the unwary; may create 
in some cases an 
opportunity for 
spoliation of evidence. 
 
No.  At fault party may 
escape liability on 
procedural technicality.  




alteration) of evidence  
Reduced incentive to 
prevent negligence. 
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liability of hospital for 
wrongdoing by 
physicians and overturns 
existing Washington law 
under Adamski v. 
Tacoma General 
Hospital.183  Reduces 
chance that patients will 
receive compensation. 
No. Hospitals that 
traditionally would have 
been held accountable 
for malpractice 
occurring on their 
premises immunized.  
Reduced incentive to 
prevent negligence.   
 
Collateral source  
(I-330, §7) 
Injured party pays for 
part of damages caused 
by wrongdoer through 
injured party’s 
premiums. 
No. At fault party is not 
held accountable for full 
damages caused; 
plaintiff covers self with 
medical/disability plan. 
 
Cap on damages  
(I-330, §1, §2) 
Reduces available 
compensation for non-
economic damages; may 
make obtaining counsel 
harder for injured 
persons without 
economic losses such as 
lost income; hurts most 
seriously injured most.  
Seeks to reverse Sofie v. 
Fibreboard Corp.184 
No.  At fault party not 
fully accountable for 
damages sustained by 
injured party.  Reduced 
financial exposure for 
injuries to women, 




cases may not be 
pursued.  
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deprives injured party of 
hearing before peers; 
may affect liability and 
damages 
No.  Possible decreased 
incentive for safe 
conduct on the part of 
the at-fault party by 
eliminating public trial. 




Some of these features build upon previous alterations to tort law.  For 
instance, in most personal injury cases—but not in medical malpractice—
the limitations period is tolled during periods of minority: the injured 
individual is not time-barred from pursuing a legal action until some period 
of time after he or she reaches adulthood.  But RCW 4.16.350185 provides, 
in pertinent part: 
For purposes of this section, notwithstanding RCW 4.16.190, the 
knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall be imputed to a 
person under the age of eighteen years, and such imputed 
knowledge shall operate to bar the claim of such minor to the same 
extent that the claim of an adult would be barred under this section. 
Any action not commenced in accordance with this section shall be 
barred. 
 
For purposes of this section, with respect to care provided after 
June 25, 1976, and before August 1, 1986, the knowledge of a 
custodial parent or guardian shall be imputed as of April 29, 1987, 
to persons under the age of eighteen years. 
Since all of the foregoing features, tend to reduce compensation to 
victims without creating any incentive for better, safer health care, 
they are only going to address “the problem.”  
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The history of RCW 4.16.190 shows a multi-generational effort to 
disfavor plaintiffs in medical malpractice claims by alteration of the 
applicable limitations period and by elimination of tolling for minorities.  I-
330 continues the trend by reducing the statute of limitations to one year for 
children seven and older, in addition to the imputation of knowledge to their 
custodial parent or guardian earlier enacted.  The imputation rules 
necessarily mean that households disadvantaged in terms of access to 
justice and financial wherewithal directly limit the rights of children in such 
households, visiting inequities upon later generations.  All the while, it is 
important to keep in mind that “the statute of limitations, although not an 
unconscionable defense, is not such a meritorious defense that either the 
law or the facts should be strained in aid of it.”186  
D. Constitutional Infirmities of Malpractice “Reform” Present in I-330 
1.  Basic Principles of Constitutional Review  
Marbury v. Madison established the principle that when a law conflicts 
with the Constitution, the judiciary determines “what the law is.”187  
Otherwise, if the legislature is free to change the constitution by legislative 
acts, the constitution would become nothing more than “form without 
substance.”188  The Marbury opinion also had a prescient formulation of 
substantive due process that shines bright today: in Marbury, Chief Justice 
John Marshall wrote, quoting Blackstone, that “every right, when withheld, 
must have a remedy, and every injury, its proper redress.”189  While an in-
depth constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this article, even a 
cursory review190 of I-330 demonstrates that enactment would implicate a 
number of state constitutional issues including separation of powers,191 due 
process,192 equal protection,193 the right to a jury trial,194 the attempt to 
reinstate caps on damages which the Washington State Supreme Court had 
already held to be unconstitutional,195 and constraints on the power of 
judges to declare the law when charging juries.196  
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2.  Separation of Powers Issues Implicated  
The practice of law in Washington State is administered by the 
Washington State Bar Association: “That association is responsible to the 
Supreme Court, not the legislature or an agency of the executive branch, for 
the delineation of its responsibilities in the admission, discipline and 
enrollment of lawyers.”197  “It is a well established principle that one of the 
inherent powers of the judiciary is the power to regulate the practice of 
law.”198  Even under the least jealous assertion of judicial power, it is 
unlikely that regulation of legal fees, as provided in I-330’s limit on 
contingent fees in Section 4, would permit an initiative such as I-330 to be 
embodied into legislation as contemplated by its proponents.199   
3.  The Challenge to Substantive Due Process 
“[I]t has been emphasized that the purpose of the due process clause is to 
protect individuals from the arbitrary exercise of government power.”200  If 
adopted, I-330’s limits on damages and attorneys’ fees would constitute 
such an unconstitutional exercise.  Fortunately, the Washington 
Constitution offers protection for Washingtonians’ due process rights.201  As 
the Washington State Supreme Court noted: 
Washington is one of many states that rely on their own 
constitutions to protect civil liberties. Since the recent 
retrenchment of the United States Supreme Court in this area, the 
appellate courts of a majority of the states have interpreted their 
state constitutions to provide greater protection for individual 
rights than does the United States Constitution.202  
In general, although, “the Washington Supreme Court has followed the 
federal judiciary in interpreting constitutional due process language,”203 
Washington’s “[d]ue process has evolved . . . to a somewhat broader notion 
of fairness”204 described as “the substantive due process test of 
reasonableness.”205  The Court articulated its three-prong test as follows: 
“1) there must be a public problem or ‘evil,’ 2) the regulation must tend to 
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solve this problem, and 3) the regulation must not be ‘unduly oppressive’ 
upon the person being regulated.”206 
Applying the three-prong test to I-330, we see that the initiative stumbles 
at the threshold of our review: it is not even clear that there is a public 
problem in terms of malpractice litigation, which I-330 purports to address.  
In Washington, the number of malpractice suits has remained steady, the 
dollar value of malpractice payouts has declined, and the number of 
practicing doctors has increased.207  In short, there is no evil being 
addressed by the initiative. 
Assuming arguendo that the first prong was met, the experience of other 
states makes abundantly clear that the proposed regulation, prominently 
featuring a “cap” on damages, does not tend to solve the problem.  Post 
“damage caps” premium increases in California (450 percent), Maryland 
(70 percent), Missouri (121 percent), Oklahoma (105 percent) and Texas 
(35 percent) demonstrate the failure of such “caps” to arrest such increases.  
Minnesota, a state that has no cap on damages, has the lowest rate of 
premium increases at 2 percent.208  The initiative fails to meet the second 
prong of the due process test. 
Lastly, in denying the injured the “proper redress” by arbitrarily imposing 
damage caps, the regulation is “unduly oppressive.”  One need only 
consider that the individuals subject to the damage caps on non-economic 
recovery are those adjudged by a jury to be the most seriously injured 
victims of medical malpractice warranting compensation for loss at the 
highest levels.   
4.  A Violation of Equal Protection: Special Immunity to the Health 
Care Industry; Special Hardship on a Class of Victims  
Washington’s Constitution prohibits laws granting special immunities 
and privileges.209  “Our constitutional guarantees to equal protection mean 
that ‘all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’”210  The 
Washington Supreme Court ruled this section “requires an independent 
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constitutional analysis from the equal protection clause of the United States 
Constitution.”211  “Enacted after the Fourteenth Amendment, state 
privileges and immunities clauses were intended to prevent people from 
seeking certain privileges or benefits to the disadvantage of others. The 
concern was prevention of favoritism and special treatment for a few, rather 
than prevention of discrimination against disfavored individuals or 
groups.”212 Moreover, “Washington’s addition of the reference to 
corporations demonstrates that our framers were concerned with undue 
political influence exercised by those with large concentrations of wealth, 
which they feared more than they feared oppression by the majority.”213   
a. The “Cap” on Non-economic Damages  
 I-330 states: 
[I]n an action or arbitration for injury or death occuring as a result 
of health care or related services, or the arranging for health care or 
related services . . . the total combined limit for civil liability for 
non-economic damages for all health care institutions . . . shall not 
exceed seven hundred thousand dollars for each claimant, 
regardless of the number of health care institutions.214   
The plain language of the text provides an unprecedented special 
immunity to health care corporations without regard for the magnitude of 
the harm or their ability to remedy the harm.215  There is no rational limit to 
the immunity: injury by ten health care institutions to a single patient is 
bound by the same limit as injury by a single provider, irrespective of the 
severity of the injury sustained by the patient or the extent to which such 
injury goes uncompensated above the arbitrary “cap” established.  The 
Washington Supreme Court has held that: 
Under the minimum [rational basis] scrutiny approach, the 
reviewing court must determine (1) whether the legislation applies 
alike to all members within the designated class; (2) whether there 
are reasonable grounds to distinguish between those within and 
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those without the class; and (3) whether the classification has a 
rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation.216   
I-330 fails this test. 
Whether such legislation applies to all members within the designated 
class may be affected by changes in the law only dimly visible at present.217  
I-330’s grant of special immunity permeates the entire health care industry. 
The law holds all health care institutions, no matter how large or small, no 
matter the line of service including sperm banks, adult family homes, 
clinics, Health Management Organizations (HMOs), or surgical facilities, to 
the same $700,000 cap.  The language, on its face, promotes creation of a 
multiplicity of health care entities for provision of care to each patient, 
promoting loss-spreading for negligent entities and their insurers. 
When it comes to the impact visited upon victims, however, limitations 
on non-economic recovery will almost certainly have a disproportionate 
impact on disempowered and disadvantaged members of society whose 
economic damages are smallest.  “Anatole France satirized formal legal 
equality by stating the poor ‘must labour in the face of the majestic equality 
of the law, which forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to 
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.’”218   
While one’s earning capacity is one aspect of value to society, a system 
that fully compensates loss of income as an “economic damage,” but denies 
full compensation for “non-economic damage,” necessarily insures that 
individuals with the highest wages will gain the largest recoveries.  Women, 
seniors, and other members of groups suffering some degree of relative 
economic disadvantage, will necessarily receive smaller verdicts.  The 
limitation on non-economic damages diminishes the relative size of any 
jury verdict allocable to the injury to plaintiffs as human beings, as opposed 
to that portion allocable to plaintiffs as engines of economic production.  
The crossover effect, by which some portion of non-economic damages is 
re-characterized by a jury as economic loss to achieve its perception of 
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overall fair compensation, is least effective in cases concerning those 
plaintiffs who were least well off pre-injury. 
Likewise, I-330 stumbles under the second prong of the equal protection 
test: “a rational basis for treating those within and without the class.”219  
There is no rational basis for treating victims of medical negligence 
differently than victims of negligence in automobile accidents, product 
liability, or other kinds of injury victims under a regime of deterrence 
established by tort law.  There is no rational basis for granting special 
immunity to members of the health care industry for their negligent acts 
while members of other industries lack this immunity.  More to the point, 
compensation of innocent victims of negligence is a cost primarily allocated 
by society in three ways: (i) by allocating all risk and burden to the victim 
and his or her family support group, eliminating the productive potential of 
the afflicted individual and support group as they experience  hardship 
unmitigated by compensation from wrongdoers; (ii) by allocation of the 
burden to the general public to the extent traditional social values mandate 
that it insure and support those members of the public who are disabled; (iii) 
by allocation of the burden to those whose negligent conduct gave rise to 
the injury and whose conduct can be prospectively deterred by a system of 
tort liability.  There is no rational basis, from a societal view, for 
eliminating victim compensation or tortfeasor deterrence220 simply because 
one is victimized by a certain flavor of negligence. 
Lastly, I-330 fails the third prong of the equal protection analysis: “a 
rational relationship to the purpose of the legislation.”221  As amply 
demonstrated, the proposed initiative fails to establish any cause-and-effect, 
let alone rational, relationship between the means sought to be enacted and 
the ends sought to be achieved. 
b. The Limit on Contingent Fees of Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
 I-330’s limits on attorneys’ fees are equally suspect under equal 
protection analysis.222  Contingent fees are long established means of 
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facilitating access to those otherwise unable to afford representation: “The 
most important justification for the contingent fee is that it opens up the 
legal system to those who could not otherwise afford it.”223  Contingent fees 
are well established in Washington law and court rules in particular and 
American jurisprudence in general.224  Therefore, our constitutional analysis 
“requires us to consider the degree of protection that Washington has 
historically given to similar situations.”225   
Here, the initiative would have the effect of severely limiting plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ fees while allowing unlimited spending on defendants’ attorneys’ 
fees.  This undermines the very increased access to justice that the 
contingent fee affords members of the public; in short, it burdens the ability 
of injury victims to pursue compensation. This reduces both incentive to sue 
and deterrence in an area where the available evidence suggests substandard 
care outstrips claims by between five and ten to one.226  There is an 
unjustified difference in the treatment of the class of lawyers handling 
medical negligence claims.  We note that attorneys who specialize in 
medical negligence claims are no different from attorneys who practice 
other forms of tort law including personal injury, product liability, 
professional liability, and toxic tort litigation.   
There is no rational relationship between the problem sought to be 
addressed and the solution.  By and large, the one rational relationship that 
has been established is the one between the insurance business cycle and 
malpractice insurance rates.227  There is no rational relationship between 
decreasing access to justice and increasing access and availability of quality 
health care in Washington. 
5.  I-330’s Twin Challenges to the Mandate under the Washington State 
Constitution that the Right to a Jury Trial be Held Inviolate    
In I-330, we find twin challenges to the right to a jury trial held to be 
inviolate under the Washington State Constitution:228 an attempt to impose a 
cap on non-economic damages so as to change the outcome of a jury 
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determination; and an effort to permit contractual waiver by patients of the 
right to a jury trial. 
a.  A Second Attempt to Impose Caps on Non-Economic Damages 
Over fifteen years before I-330 was presented to the voters, the 
unconstitutionality of a cap on non-economic damages had already been 
determined in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.229  In a fashion similar to I-330, 
“[t]he statute [in Sofie] operate[d] by taking a jury’s finding of fact and 
altering it to conform to a predetermined formula.”230  The Washington 
Supreme Court found that the function of the jury included determination of 
damages, holding: “To the jury is consigned under the [Washington] 
constitution the ultimate power to weigh the evidence and determine the 
facts – and the amount of damages in a particular case is an ultimate 
fact.”231  The application of community standards and values inherent in a 
verdict determining non-economic losses (in contradistinction to economic 
losses) experienced by plaintiffs is uniquely suitable for determination by a 
jury of their peers: “The jury’s role in determining non-economic damages 
is perhaps even more essential.”232  The Sofie court concluded, “We find the 
non-economic damages limit unconstitutional on adequate and independent 
state [constitutional] grounds.”233 
Sofie was not the first time the constitutional guarantee to a jury trial had 
been upheld.  In 1889, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated “a 
scheme for determining the value of train-killed animals by appraisers [as] 
unconstitutional because it denied the right to a jury trial.”234  In a sense, I-
330 is an attempt to proffer special immunities to the health care industry 
that were held unconstitutional to powerful railroad companies in their 
heyday in the 1880s.   
Simply put, I-330’s legislative act “may not preempt a jury’s findings on 
a factual issue which has properly been submitted to the jury.”235 
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b.  An Attempt to “Negotiate” Away the Inviolate Right to a Jury Trial 
I-330, § 8 authorizes inclusion of contractual language in a form 
suggesting a quid pro quo trade between parties of the right to a jury trial 
for mandatory arbitration.  The circumstance under which such a trade 
would often occur—an individual seeking medical care, even emergency 
care, for themselves or a loved one—has all the hallmarks of a contract of 
adhesion.  Such contractual “trades” operate under the pretext that classical 
contract bargaining is occurring when, to the contrary, the facts of the 
modern world suggest that such language simply becomes part of the legal 
“boilerplate” of a contract which modern consumers have neither the time, 
training or motivation to negotiate—even were the receptionist in the clinic 
or the nurse in the emergency room in a position to negotiate the provisions.  
I-330, § 8 states, in pertinent part: 
A contract for health care services . . . must have the provision as 
the first article of contract and the provision must be expressed in 
the following language:  
It is understood that any dispute as to medical malpractice . . . will 
be determined by submission to arbitration . . . and not by lawsuit 
or resort to court process . . . .  Both parties to this contract . . . are 
giving up their constitutional right to have such a dispute decided 
in the court of law before a jury . . . .  (Emphasis added.) 
Given the evident constitutional infirmities in I-330, the motivation of its 
proponents remains unclear.  Why would its advocates invest millions of 
dollars and expend tens of thousands of hours to promote an initiative so 
plainly destined for judicial review and probable reversal?  The current 
political alignment of the proponents and opponents of I-330 suggests one 
possible explanation: the initiative was intended to serve as part of a war of 
attrition, testing and draining the resources of its opponents, or as a feint 
requiring initiative opponents to commit resources otherwise available to 
advance (or oppose) other items on the local or national political agenda.  
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6.  Other Constitutional Infirmities: Judges Shall Declare the Law.   
Article IV, Section 16 of the Washington Constitution declares that 
judges shall declare the law. 236   “[A]n instruction which does no more than 
accurately state the law pertaining to an issue does not constitute an 
impermissible comment on the evidence by the trial judge.”237  I-330 
expressly prohibits the trial judge from instructing the jury with respect to 
the statute’s limitations on non-economic damages: “the jury shall not be 
informed of the limitations on non-economic damages.”238 What then is the 
effect of a legislative enactment that instructs the judiciary to hide the law 
from the jury?  “Since this is a rule of law, it is appropriate that the jury be 
informed of this by the instructions of the court.”239    The gag order violates 
Art. IV, Sec. 16 by prohibiting trial judges from performing their 
constitutionally mandated duties, and by extension, violates Art. I, Sec. 21 
by impermissibly intruding in the ability of the jury to award just 
compensation and the separation of legislative from judicial powers. 
Whatever the merits of the foregoing constitutional interpretation, it only 
takes one plaintiff’s attorney requesting a jury instruction on the limitation 
on non-economic damages and one trial court judge to accede to the request 
for an appellate court to have before it the question of whether violation of 
the “gag order” constitutes “harmless error.”  
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IV.  EPILOGUE:  THE CAMPAIGN AND BEYOND 
On November 8, 2005, Washington voters rejected both I-330 and I-
336:240 
 
Votes For Votes Against 
Measure 
Vote Vote % Vote Vote % 
     
Initiative 
Measure 330 - 
Negligent 
Health care 
783435 43.2705% 1027117 56.7295% 
Initiative 
Measure 336 - 
Medical 
Malpractice 
711443 39.7818% 1076918 60.2182% 
 
Both initiatives were rejected by a decisive margin, but when the smoke 
cleared and the dust settled, it was clear that the coalition of forces who 
joined together on the “No on I-330” campaign were exultant.  Outspent 
nearly two to one, the raft of labor, consumer, nurse, patient, bar 
association, community, Democratic, church and trial lawyer advocacy 
groups had chosen a bold tactic: they had abandoned support for I-336 and 
focused on opposition to I-330 about which there was a stronger consensus.  
By contrast, the proponents of I-330 (largely insurance, physician and 
pharmaceutical interests) had divided their message and campaign resources 
between advocating for I-330 and opposing I-336.   
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With an initial lead in early campaign polling, the public response to I-
330 increasingly shifted to skepticism.  Urged by the “No on I-330” 
campaign to “Read the Fine Print”241 and supported by a robust yard sign 
campaign featuring the now familiar logo of a magnifying glass over the 
“o” in “No on I-330” signs, it appears that the public did so.  The absence of 
any cap on insurance rate increases while capping non-economic damage 
awards from juries, the provisions waiving the right to jury in contracts for 
medical services, the reversion of the unpaid portion of structure settlements 
to insurers/defendants in the event of the death of the plaintiff, and the 
generally negative tone of the campaign soured the public’s appetite for the 
flavor of “reform” being advocated. It was not apparent how capping 
damage awards and having structured settlement payments revert to the 
insurance company or defendant would advance the promise made by I-330 
proponents on their website to “get more money to injured patients.”242 
Increasingly, the public questioned the appropriateness of having complex 
matters resolved by initiative at all.243   
In the end, proponents of I-330 appeared to devolve into lawyer bashing 
and name calling,  urging members of the public to “Help bring the lying 
lawyers to justice” and  to “Follow the liars’ money.”244  
In some respects, this tale of two initiatives has primarily been the tale of 
I-330.  As a local manifestation of a national phenomenon, I-330 sought to 
alter the civil justice system in favor of organized defendants and against 
the unorganized public, which in its midst includes the yet unknown 
prospective victims of medical negligence.  Our examination of I-330 
confirms the open secret that spikes in medical liability insurance premiums 
appear to be related to insurance business cycles, not to jury verdicts. It 
follows that efforts to burden plaintiffs’ access to justice, to remove 
incentives from representation of injured people, and to limit recovery by 
innocent victims will prove ineffective as a means of regulating insurance 
premiums. 
742 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
TORT REFORM 
I-336, with its forthright cap on insurance rate increases and proposals for 
increasing transparency of rate setting, holds out hope for Washington 
physicians that I-330 did not.  Increasing the vigilance of the Medical 
Quality Assurance Commission, mandating experience based rating for 
physicians’ insurance, and increasing the transparency of medical 
malpractice settlements holds out a promise of better, safer health care for 
patients in Washington. 
One cannot help but be mindful of the fact that our tale of two initiatives 
is necessarily a tale of the initiative process itself.  Recent experience 
suggests that initiative campaigns suffer from the same frailties as other 
political campaigns: enormous costs incurred in an effort to get the attention 
of a public preoccupied with the concerns of daily living, a public education 
challenge of the first magnitude.  Indeed, where campaigns ask the public to 
make important policy decisions, it is important that voices of reason be 
recognized and heard above the mind-bending din of special interest 
advocacy and attack advertising.  The power of special interests to lobby 
elected representatives of the people has long been regarded as 
problematic.245  Most citizens lack the time, financial wherewithal, 
organization, and motivation to lobby for their own general interests.  An 
initiative directly from the people might appear to present an antidote to the 
unrestrained lobbying of the people’s representatives in the legislature.  
This promise, however, can go unrealized where massive resources of 
interested groups expend millions of dollars lobbying the people directly 
through disinformation campaigns. The task of promoting and funding 
public education generally and civics education specifically is an 
appropriate challenge for any democracy and one foreseen by our 
Founders.246 
Our initiatives also subsist in a context where access to medical care of 
quality is in crisis.  Both initiatives were able to galvanize a public eager for 
solutions with the promise of improvements, but neither initiative addressed 
the basic, underlying, unmet challenge of providing high quality medical 
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care to our people.  It is likely that there is a broad consensus in the public 
as to what is desired respecting medical care: accessibility, affordability, 
portability, transferability, security, quality, and universality, all to the end 
that no person’s health need depend on his or her wealth.  It will take bold 
leadership to gain public acceptance of the choices and sacrifices necessary 
to fulfill such desires. 
What would have been a damaging blow to civil justice has been averted 
by the defeat of I-330.  As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Marbury v. 
Madison: “The very essence of civil liberty, certainly consists in the right of 
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives 
an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that 
protection.”247  I-330 is but the latest challenge to traditional constitutional 
protections.  It remains to be seen whether the exhaustion of the financial 
resources of the opponents of I-330 engendered by the initiative campaigns 
will, in the final analysis, prove to be a victory for I-330 proponents in 
battles to come. 
Fulfillment of a vision of social justice calls for true reform that takes on 
the challenges of campaign reform for our democracy, civics education for 
our electorate, and health care for our people. 
This is the lesson of the tale of two initiatives. 
POST-SCRIPT 
In post-election negotiations, Governor Christine Gregoire convened a 
series of meetings with representatives of the Washington State Trial 
Lawyers Association, Washington State Medical Association, Washington 
State Hospital Association and Physicians Insurance who agreed upon a 
compromise bill addressing health care liability reform, Second Substitute 
House Bill 2292 (“2 SHB 2292”), which passed the State House with the 
amendments of the State Senate on February 28, 2006.248  Widely hailed as 
a good first step, 2 SHB 2292 is as significant for what it does not include, 
as for what it addresses.249  Whether the accord ushers in an era of peace or 
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is simply a cease fire in an ongoing clash of opposing interests remains to 
be seen.  
 
                                                 
1 Randolph I. Gordon, J.D. Harvard Law School (1978), B.A. University of Michigan 
(1975) is an Adjunct Professor at Seattle University School of Law, Teaching Products 
Liability and Remedies.  He is a member of the Bellevue, Washington law firm Gordon 
Edmunds Elder, PLLC, with an active mediation, arbitration, and trial practice. 
2 Brook Assefa is a J.D. candidate at Seattle University School of Law (2006) and an 
associate editor of the Seattle University Law Review.  Brook holds a B.A. in Applied 
Mathematics from the University of California, Berkeley (1987) and an M.S. in Electrical 
Engineering from the University of Washington (1996). 
3 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1 
(Linda T. Kohn et. al. eds., 2000), available at 
http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309068371. 
4 Includes 106,000 deaths due to "nonerror adverse effects of medications."  Barbara 
Starfield, M.D., M.P.H., Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 JAMA 483, 484 
(2000). 
5 PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE BRIEFING BOOK: CHALLENGING THE 
MISLEADING CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS’ LOBBY 41 (2004), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/MedMalBriefingBook08-09-04.pdf. [hereinafter 
PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].  “Just 5.4 percent of doctors have been 
responsible for 56.2 percent of all malpractice payouts to patients, according to NPDB 
[National Practitioner Data Bank] data from September 1990 through 2003.  Each of 
these doctors has made at least two payouts.  Even more surprising, just 2 percent of 
doctors, each of whom has made three or more malpractice payouts, were responsible for 
31.1 percent of all payouts.”  Id. 
 This parallels the experience in Washington State where, “[a]ccording to the federal 
government’s National Practitioner Data Bank, which covers malpractice judgments and 
settlements since September 1990, just 3.5 percent of Washington’s doctors have been 
responsible for 42.6 percent of all malpractice payouts to patients.”  PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS IN WASHINGTON: CHALLENGING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CLAIMS OF THE DOCTORS’ LOBBY 18 (2003), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/WA_State.pdf [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL 
MISDIAGNOSIS IN WASHINGTON]. 
6 Initiative Measure No. 330 [hereinafter Text of I-330].  The text, as certified by 
Secretary of State Sam Reed, is available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/pub/billinfo/2003-04/initiatives/325-
349/initiative_330_07122004.txt.  
7 Initiative Measure No. 336 [hereinafter Text of I-336].   The text, as certified by 
Secretary of State Sam Reed, is available at 
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i336.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
8 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also, Washam v. Sonntag, 874 P.2d 188, 193 (1994) 
(holding that referendum provisions in the Washington State Constitution are to be 
liberally construed to facilitate the referendum rights of the citizenry). 
A Tale of Two Initiatives 745 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
 
9 Doctors, Nurses & Patients for a Healthy Washington, http://www.yesoni330.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
10 Citizens for Better, Safer Healthcare, http://www.bettersafercare.org/ (last visited Feb. 
19, 2006). 
11 Brad Shannon, A Record Year for Political Money: Spending Spirals Upward for 
Initiatives, THE OLYMPIAN, Nov. 3, 2005, at 1. 
12 See generally Text of I-330, supra note 6.   
13 See generally Text of I-336, supra note 7. 
14 For a recent update on the reform efforts of the fifty states, see Adam D. Glassman, 
The Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They 
Cure the Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 431-58 (2004). 
15 See, e.g., George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Address 
(Jan. 28, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/release19.html (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2006). 
 It is a central premise of this article, which will be explored further, infra in Sections II 
and III, that one ought not to presuppose that everything labeled “reform” actually 
partakes of the positive connotations of “improvement” or “correction.”  
16 Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 15 provides: “In the event that the Washington state 
supreme court or other court of competent jurisdiction rules or affirms that section 2 of 
this act is unconstitutional, then the prescribed limitations on noneconomic damages set 
forth in section 2 of this act take effect upon the ratification of a state constitutional 
amendment that empowers the legislature to enact limits on the amount of noneconomic 
damages recoverable in any or all civil causes of action or upon the enactment by the 
United States congress of a law permitting such limitations on noneconomic damages, 
whichever occurs first.” (Emphasis added.) 
17 Press Release, Washington State Nurses Association, Nursing Organizations and 
Elected Officials Speak Out Against Medical Malpratice Initiatives (Oct. 18, 2005), 
available at http://www.wsna.org/snas/wa/library/2005.malpractice/default.asp.   
18 Our constitutional analysis is primarily based on the Washington Constitution and its 
clauses regarding due process (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3), equal protection (WASH. 
CONST. art. I, § 12), and jury trials (WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21). 
19 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW § 6 (6th Ed. 
2003) and the discussion therein on tort law.  The continued vitality of Washington’s tort 
law and the integrity of this system for redress of civil wrongs is one issue at the 
threshold of our tale of two initiatives.  Judge Learned Hand first articulated the 
economic underpinnings of tort law with his now famous formula, “The Learned Hand” 
Formula [B < P x L  N], in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2nd 
Cir. 1947). This formula acts as a bridge between traditional tort analysis of negligence 
and economic “utility” analysis.  Negligence (“N”) results whenever the burden (“B”) of 
avoiding an injury to another is “less than” (“<“) the probability of the loss (“P”) 
multiplied by the magnitude loss (“L”).  Professor and Judge Richard Posner writes, 
“Maintaining the credibility of the tort system requires that if a defendant is found liable, 
he must pay at least as great as L in the Hand Formula.  Damages equal to L are 
compensatory damages.”  POSNER, supra, at 192.  I-330, to the extent that it reduces the 
recovery of victims, is reducing the “L” by not allowing full compensation for the loss for 
746 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
TORT REFORM 
 
reasons other than the merits.  The grant of special immunity to one species of tortfeasor 
necessarily leaves uncompensated one species of innocent victim.  In our current 
consideration of I-330, we dare not leave unstated the fundamental truth that measures 
that insulate health care providers from liability or tend to limit their liability necessarily 
shift to victims and to society at large the uncompensated costs and consequences of 
injuries adjudged to be the product of negligence and reduce disincentives for negligent 
care. 
20 Kenneth Vinson, Constitutional Stumbling Blocks to Legislative Tort Reform, 15 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 31, 31 (1987). 
21 Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-Majoritarian Thesis: The Case of Torts, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 533, 540 (1999). 
22 Consider that caps on damages awarded by jury verdicts only serve to limit 
compensation to the most seriously injured plaintiffs whom a jury has adjudged to be 
entitled to compensation from negligent defendants. 
23 I-336’s approach seeks to create a regulatory regime with a greater range of medical 
liability insurance options, creating a supplemental malpractice insurance program (§ 105 
et seq.), providing for expanded malpractice incidents reporting requirements and public 
access to malpractice information (§ 126 et seq.); mandating greater transparency 
respecting insurance rate setting (§§ 102, 103), and enhancing physician oversight by, 
inter alia, adding two patient advocates to the Medical Quality Assurance Commission (§ 
201).  See Text of I-336, supra note 7. 
24 WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19.  “No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that 
shall be expressed in the title.”  Id.  This provision applies to initiatives to the people. 
Washington Fed’n of State Employees v. Washington, 901 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Wash. 
1995). 
25 I-336’s approach is three-pronged with efforts (i) to increase regulatory oversight of 
malpractice rate setting and increased reporting requirements (see, e.g., Text of I-336, 
supra note 7, at §§ 102, 103, 105, 126) (insurance reform); (ii) creating a presumptive 
limit of two on the number of expert witnesses and requiring the filing of a certificate of 
merit confirming consultation with a qualified expert respecting the basis for recovery 
(id. at §§ 301, 302) (court reform); and (iii) enhancing review and discipline of repeat 
offender doctors (id. at § 201) (medical review reform).  In this last category, it is worth 
noting that Washington ranks forty-first out of fifty states respecting the frequency with 
which it takes significant disciplinary action for serious ethical and professional 
misconduct or malfeasance, such as incompetence, sexual misconduct, misprescribing 
drugs, and criminal convictions.  PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS IN 
WASHINGTON, supra note 5, at 22.  In 2002, the Washington State Medical Quality 
Review Commission only levied serious discipline on 36 of its 16,154 physicians.  Id. at 
3.  Unlike I-330’s measures, the measures of I-336 do not generally impact the rights of 
citizens to pursue compensation for injury and, accordingly, do not impair the traditional 
disincentives to preventable error advanced by the tort system. Nonetheless, the authors 
do not advocate the use of initiatives as the preferred method of legislating or 
rulemaking. 
26 One provision of I-330 which most clearly shows insurance industry interests as the 
beneficiary of initiative provisions is contained at § 10 ¶¶ 4, 5, which provides that 
A Tale of Two Initiatives 747 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
 
unexpended structured payments (payments over time) to the plaintiff allocable to non-
economic damages will, post-judgment, in the event of the plaintiff’s death, revert to the 
insurance company rather than descend to the spouse, children, or heirs of the plaintiff.  
This post-judgment diminution of the insurance company obligations is not 
counterbalanced by an increase in potential liability to address, say, post-judgment 
increases in medical expenses experienced by the plaintiff.  Text of I-330, supra note 6.  
This provision proved, in the experience of one of us [Gordon], to be one of the least 
popular provisions made known to the voters. 
27 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, ET. AL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 14 (2004). 
28 Id. at 15-16. 
29 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE—TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 102-
03 (2002). 
30 NATIONAL COALITION ON HEALTH CARE, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE (2004), 
http:www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml.   
31 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HIDDEN COSTS, VALUES LOST: UNINSURANCE IN AMERICA 
10 (2003). 
32 Id. 
33 See id. at 89-91. 
34 See generally AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS–AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNAL MEDICINE (ACP–ASIM), STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD OF THE WAYS AND 
MEANS HEALTH SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING ON THE NATION’S UNINSURED (Apr. 4, 
2001), available at http://www.acponline.org/hpp/ways_means.htm. 
35 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH—PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 46 (2004). 
36  AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS–AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 
(ACP–ASIM), supra note 34, at [3].  The ACP-ASIM also stated, “More than 80 percent 
of the uninsured are in working families, but 60 percent are not offered employer-based 
health insurance coverage. These families must choose between a doctor’s appointment 
and feeding their families, buying medicine or paying the rent.”  Id. at [2]. 
37 Bureau of Labor Education, University of Maine, The U.S. Health Care System: Best 
in the World, or Just the Most Expensive? 2 (2001), available at 
http://dll.umaine.edu/ble/U.S.%20HCweb.pdf.  
38 Id. at 5.  “The most recent complete comparative data analysis for infant mortality 
rates are from 1996, according to both the National Center for Health Statistics and the 
U.S. Department for Health and Human Services (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, ‘Preventing Infant Mortality,’ HHS Fact Sheet, (Apr. 18, 2001)).”  Id. at 5 n.17. 
39 Donald J. Palmisano, M.D., J.D., Statement of the American Medical Association to 
the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of  Representatives, Re: Legislative Hearing 
on H.R. 5, to Improve Patient Access to Health Care Services and Provide Improved 
Medical Care by Reducing the Excessive Burden the Liability System Places on the 
Health Care Delivery System (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/12991.html. 
40 See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.   
41 POSNER, supra note 19, at 192. 
748 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
TORT REFORM 
 
42 See Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 4(2)(a)-(c), which would amend WASH. REV. 
CODE § 7.70.070 (2006).  For example, under I-330, a $600,000 plaintiff judgment would 
result in attorneys fees of a maximum of $161,000, i.e., less than 27 percent.  But a 
damage award of $6 million would result in attorneys fees of $971,000, i.e., less than 17 
percent. Reduced incentives adversely affect the willingness of counsel to take on 
prolonged, expensive, and novel cases.  In a curious reversal, those who espouse 
traditional capitalist values see no contradiction in reducing incentives to pursue tobacco-
related illness, asbestos, and products liability claims, which have greatly inured to the 
benefit of the public. 
43 For an interesting exposition, see Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights 
Movement, and the Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1983 (2004). 
44 Abel, supra note 21, at 546.  
45 Yeazell, supra note 43 (quoting NAN ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC 
INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S AND BEYOND 8 (1989)). 
46 Id. at 1997.  Ironically, the resistance to Brown “constituted an important step in the 
restructuring of the U.S. bar.”  Id.  In one of Brown’s progeny, NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963), the NAACP challenged Virginia’s newly enacted schemes for 
regulating civil rights lawyers, which were aimed at cutting off the NAACP from 
potential litigants.  Yeazell, supra note 43, at 1986.  The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated 
Virginia’s laws as violative of the First Amendment right of expression and association, 
noting that they were “part of the program of ‘massive resistance’ against Brown.”  
Button, 371 U.S. at 446.  Button’s offspring, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 
(1977), also struck on First Amendment grounds “state limitations on attorney 
advertising.”  See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
1249 (2004). 
47 Yeazell, supra note 43, at 1991. 
48 Id. at 1995. 
49 Randolph I. Gordon, No Balm in Gilead: Why Workers’ Compensation Fails Workers 
in a Toxic Age, in DEFINING MULTIPLE CHEMICAL SENSITIVITY 85 (Bonnye L. Matthews 
ed., 1998).  
50 Yeazell, supra note 43, at 1997.   
51 Id. at 2002-2003. 
52 Id. at 1976. 
53 Id. at 2002. 
54 Id. 
55 There is a deep populist thread in American politics which, from the days of the 
Founding Fathers, has distrusted elitism and government power.  Popular disparagement 
of the jury, the ultimate populist institution, however, is a disturbing trend suggesting a 
merger between anti-authoritarian traditions and a sort of lawless “Know-Nothingism.”  
Public education, respecting the importance of juries as a counterbalance to government 
excesses, is essential. 
56 Id. at 1978. 
57 In our analysis, we shall see the oft-asserted linkage between (i) allegedly unjustified 
verdicts by runaway juries on frivolous claims to (ii) increased insurance payouts to (iii) 
increased premiums to (iv) doctor flight to (v) unavailability of medical care, to be untrue 
A Tale of Two Initiatives 749 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
 
and unsubstantiated at virtually every link in the chain.  See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, 
MEDICAL MISDIAGNOSIS IN WASHINGTON, supra note 5, at 1-6. 
58 Id. 
59 Abel, supra note 21, at 553.   
60 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 3. 
61 Bush, supra note 15. 
62 George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Adddress, (Jan. 
20, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-
7.html. 
63 George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Feb. 2, 
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050202-
11.html. 
64 See, e.g.., George W. Bush, President of the United States, Address at University of 
Scranton: President Calls for Medical Liability Reform (Jan. 16, 2003) (transcript 
available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030116-1.html). 
65 NOAM CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOCRACY 357 (1992). 
66 DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., 
1987), available at  http://www.econlib.org/library/LFBooks/Hume/hmMPL4.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
67 Noam Chomsky, The Manufacture of Consent, in THE CHOMSKY READER 121-36 
(1987). 
68 NOAM CHOMSKY, DETERRING DEMOCRACY 357 (1992). 
69 See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF,  DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES 
AND FRAME THE DEBATE—THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004).   
70 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (Oxford Press 2d ed. 1978) (1888); 
DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (Oxford Press 2d ed. 1970) (1777).  Faced 
with a classic problem of inductive reasoning, public policy makers must reach general 
conclusions based on a series of observations and are well advised to adopt some species 
of practical skepticism.  If the number of observations and associations are too few, we 
may rightly discount such evidence as anecdotal.  Chalmers notes that the number of data 
points sufficient to justify a sound conclusion is highly fact-sensitive: the number of 
observations sufficient to establish when we may conclude inductively that “All swans 
are white” may not be the same as are required to conclude that “Nuclear weapons have 
great destructive capability.”  See A.F. CHALMERS, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED 
SCIENCE? 47 (Open University Press 3d ed. 1999) (1978).    
71 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 
1093 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Malpractice Misconceptions and Other Lessons about the 
Litigation System, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 7 (1993). 
72 Throughout this article, the term “reform” appears in quotation marks to suggest to the 
reader that the term “reform,” which denotes betterment or improvement, is itself a non-
neutral descriptor of the changes proposed that assumes the merit of the very proposals 
under review.  Amongst opponents to proposed changes to the tort system, the term tort 
“deform” is often employed, suggesting that the proposals, to the contrary, seek to distort 
750 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
TORT REFORM 
 
in an undesirable fashion the existing laws.  The course proposed by the author is an 
examination of the evidence. 
73 Alternatives exist.  For instance, the exclusive remedy Washington workers have 
against their employers for personal injuries in the workplace resulting from employer 
negligence arises under the Industrial Insurance Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 et 
seq. (2006).  Washington courts have no original jurisdiction over such actions: “The 
state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares 
that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, . . . and to that 
end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all 
jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in 
this title provided.”  Id. at  § 51.04.010.  In the first instance, worker compensation is 
determined by a State agency, the Department of Labor & Industries, with hearings 
conducted by administrative judges without a jury, and appeals considered by a three 
judge panel at the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals. See, e.g., id. at § 51.28 et seq; 
id. at § 51.52.010 (2006).  Awards are based upon a schedule of damages widely 
regarded as less generous than those available in the civil justice system, but without 
having to prove “fault.” Id. at § 51.32.010.  For instance, complete loss of hearing in both 
ears and loss of one eye by enucleation are compensable as permanent partial disabilities 
for $43,200 and $21,600, respectively, plus adjustments per the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI).  Id. at § 51.32.080.  Workers, however, may recover damages over and above 
scheduled workers compensation benefits if they can establish that the injury was a 
consequence of the “deliberate intention of his or her employer to produce such injury.”  
Id. at § 51.24.020.   
74 Id. at § 7.70 et seq. 
75 Id. at § 4.16.350; cf. id. at § 4.16.190.  Specifically, the knowledge of a custodial 
parent or guardian is imputed to a person under the age of eighteen years in actions for 
injuries arising from health care or related services; otherwise actions are generally tolled 
during the minority of the injured party. 
76 See, e.g., Shellenbarger v. Brigman, 3 P.3d 211, 215 (Wash. App. 2000). 
77 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.080. 
78 The “preponderance of the evidence” is defined in the Washington Pattern Jury 
Instructions as follows: “more probably true than not true.” Washington Pattern Jury 
Instructions—Civil, in 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE SERIES, 5TH EDITION, WPI 21.01, at 
221 (2005). 
79 “It has long been established that recovery of punitive damages is contrary to the 
public policy of the State and will not be allowed unless expressly authorized by statute.”  
Kennewick Educ. Ass’n, v. Kennewick Sch. Dist. No. 17, 666 P.2d 928, 930 (Wash. 
App. 1983); see also: Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank, 649 P.2d 827 (Wash. 1982); Steele 
v. Johnson, 458 P.2d 889, 890 (Wash. 1969); Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 
1072 (Wash. 1891).  
80 In Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 4.20.010 et seq. (2006), authorizes the personal 
representative of the estate of a decedent to pursue claims for wrongful death on behalf of 
certain statutory beneficiaries: the spouse and child or children of the decedent (if any); 
the parents and siblings of the decedent (if no spouse or child exists), if dependent upon 
the decedent and residing in the United States.   
A Tale of Two Initiatives 751 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
 
81 See, e.g., Attwood v. Albertson’s Food Centers, Inc., 966 P.2d 351, 353 (Wash. App. 
1998); Washington Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil, in 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE 
SERIES, supra note 78. 
82 See, e.g., McKee v. American Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1048 (Wash. 1989) 
(Arizona physician affidavit could not establish standard of care for Washington 
pharmacist); Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 770 P.2d 182 (Wash. 1989) (Pharmacist not 
competent to opine on physician’s standard of care for treatment using medications); 
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil, in 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, supra note 
78, at 559. 
83 Washington Rules of Evidence, ER 702 (2006), provides that “[i]f scientific, technical 
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 
84 WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.380 (2006), provides that ten jurors must agree before there 
is a verdict of a jury of twelve; Washington Pattern Jury Instructions so provide: 
Washington Pattern Jury Instructions—Civil, in 6 WASHINGTON PRACTICE, supra note 
78, at 34.  See also Washington Superior Court Civil Rules (CR) 49(l), providing that the 
same ten jurors need not agree on every question contained within a special verdict. 
85 It should be noted that current proposals for medical liability “reform” do not seek to 
create a no-fault system analogous to workers compensation (with all of its strengths and 
weaknesses), but simply seek to make it more difficult for  injured plaintiffs to prevail. 
The consequence of such proposals, for example, shortening the statute of limitations for 
health care claims, would  be to lift the burden of future costs of health care from 
negligent defendants and place it upon the general public.    A no-fault system might well 
be subject to all of the criticisms of the current workers compensation scheme; such 
criticisms go well beyond the scope of this article but would undoubtedly include: loss of 
the right to a jury trial in the first instance; administrative costs and delays; burdens of 
premiums upon employers; challenges to the setting of such premiums; reduced 
compensation to the victim and, as a consequence, reduction in the incentive for safety on 
the part of the liable party. 
86 See generally David M. Studdert et. al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical 
Injury Burden, Malpractice Litigation, and Alternative Compensation Models from Utah 
and Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643 (2000);  Harvard Medical Practice Study Group, 
Patients, Doctors and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient 
Compensation in New York (1990), as quoted by PUBLIC CITIZEN, MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 5, at 14-15: “found that only one in 7.6 
instances of medical negligence committed in hospitals results in a malpractice claim.” 
87 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197 (4)(e), (5) (2006). 
88 The Agency for Health Care Administration, Division of Health Quality Assurance, 
Reported Malpractice Claims by District Compared to Reported Adverse Incidents 1996, 
1997, 1998, 1999, http://ww.fdhc.state.fl.us/MCHQ/Health_Facility-
_Regulation/Risk/statistics.shtml (last visited Feb. 19, 2006). 
89 Studdert, et. al, supra note 86, at 1664. 
90 Id. at 1664-65. 
752 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
TORT REFORM 
 
91 Id. at 1664, Table 3 (New York (13.1 percent filed; 86.9 percent unfiled); Florida 
(15.97 percent filed; 84.03 percent unfiled); Colorado (14.9 percent filed; 85.1 percent 
unfiled); Utah (19.6 percent filed; 80.4 percent unfiled)). 
92 Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises 
Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 357, 358 (2005). 
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but professed relief when an out-of-state expert supporting his opinion was found.  It is 
now standard practice among the medical malpractice plaintiffs’ bar to retain expert 
witnesses out of the jurisdiction in which the case is brought.  Academic institutions 
routinely discourage physicians holding academic positions from participating as expert 
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incentive to assert defenses tending to prolong litigation.  Even Washington’s Rules of 
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A Tale of Two Initiatives 753 
VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 2 • 2006 
 
which provides that pleadings, motions, and briefs are not “interposed for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
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available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us./cgi-
bin/tlo/textframe.cmd?LEG=78&SESS=R&CHAMBER=H&BILLTYPE=JR&BILLSUFF
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hospitals may be held liable for a physician’s acts or omissions under “apparent 
authority” or “ostensible authority”).  I-330 would reverse Adamski and only impose 
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hospital.  See Text of I-330, supra note 6. 
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CODE 4.56.250 unconstitutional because they violated the right to a jury trial under 
WASH. CONST. art. I,  § 21). 
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REV. CODE] § 4.16.010 and [WASH. REV. CODE] § 4.16.080(2), which then provided a 
three year accrual-based statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions, as 
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Ruth, the Legislature enacted [WASH. REV. CODE] 4.16.350 in 1971, and provided for a 
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186 Rochester v. Tulp, 337 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wash. 1959); Wickwire v. Reard, 226 P.2d 
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187 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
188 Id. at 174. 
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under the exclusive jurisidiction of the Washington State Supreme Court.  The 
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payouts evaporates once one realizes that plaintiffs’ attorneys’ contingent fees are paid by 
plaintiffs or their personal representatives from the compensation awarded for injury or 
death—it is the unregulated costs of legal defense that increase payout. 
192 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” 
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citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the 
same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” 
194 See Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 8 (mandatory arbitration of claims under 
contract); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21:  “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, 
but the legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of 
record, and for verdict by nine or more jurors in civil cases in any court of record, and for 
waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given 
thereto.”  Gordon served on the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar 
Association as Governor (8th Congressional District) when a position on I-330 was 
presented to that body.  Pursuant to General Rule (GR) 12(c), which defines its authority, 
the Washington State Bar Association undertook a review of I-330 and found it 
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decision-making functions. The impairment of the right to a jury trial was one of the two 
constitutional grounds leading the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar 
Association to oppose the enactment of I-330. The Board of Governors took no position 
on I-336, it being determined that I-336 did not substantially implicate the 
“administration of justice.” 
195 See, e.g., Sofie, 771 P.2d at 722 (holding non-economic damage caps of WASH. REV. 
CODE § 4.56.250 unconstitutional because they violated the right to a jury trial under 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21). 
196 WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 16: “Judges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of 
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197 In re Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 548 P.2d 310, 313 (Wash. 1976); See In re Bruen, 172 P. 
1152 (Wash. 1918); In re Schatz, 497 P.2d 153 (Wash. 1972).  
198 Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730, 735 
(Wash. 1981).  See also  Bruen, 172 P. 1152; In re Wash. State Bar. Ass’n, 548 P.2d 310 
(Wash. 1976); State v. Cook, 525 P.2d 761 (Wash. 1974); Schatz, 497 P.2d 153; State ex 
rel. Laughlin v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, 176 P.2d 301 (Wash. 1947); In re Levy, 161 P.2d 
651 (Wash. 1945).  See also Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 177 (Wash. 1984) 
(Rosselini, J., dissenting):  
“Const. art. 4, § 1, provides: ‘The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court’. Inherent in this constitutionally granted power is this court’s inviolate authority to 
regulate the practice of law. Seattle v. Ratliff, 667 P.2d 630 (Wash. 1983). This power to 
regulate the practice of law is solely within the province of the judiciary. Hagan & Van 
Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 635 P.2d 730 (1981).” 
199 Such was the sense of the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar 
Association during discussions on June 2, 2005, in Bellevue, Washington when 
consideration of “separation of powers” issues raised by I-330 led to a 12-0-0 vote in 
favor of taking a position respecting the initiative.  See Lindsay Thompson, The Board’s 
Work, WASHINGTON STATE BAR NEWS (Sept. 2005), available at 
http://www.wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/2005/board.htm. 
 In its July 30, 2005 meeting in Bellingham, Washington, the Board of Governors 
concluded on a vote of 10-4, that its GR [General Rule] 12 analysis, did not warrant 
taking a position on I-336 which did not clearly implicate “the practice of law” or the 
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200 State v. McCullough, 784 P.2d 566, 568 (Wash. App. 1990), citing State v. Cater’s 
Motor Freight Sys. Inc., 179 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1947). 
201 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” 
202 Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 811 (citing  Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal 
System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 499 (1984)).  
203 ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 18 (2002). 
204 Id. at 17. 
205 Rivett v. City of Tacoma, 870 P.2d 299, 303 (Wash. 1994). 
206 Id., quoting Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (1990). 
207 See supra notes 72-187 and accompanying text.  
208 See Sharkey, supra note 124, at 408. 
209 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12 states, “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class 
of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges and immunities which upon 
the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” 
210 O’Hartigan v. Dep’t of Personnel, 821 P.2d 44, 50 (Wash. 1991), quoting Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
211 Grant County Fire Protection Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake,  83 P.3d 419, 425 
(Wash. 2004). 
212 Id. at 427 (quoting State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring)). 
213 Id. at 426 (citing Brian Snure, A Frequent Recurrence to Fundamental Principles: 
Individuals Rights, Free Government, and the Washington State Constitution, 67 WASH 
L. REV. 669, 671-72 (1992)) (emphasis added). 
214 Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 2(3). 
215 To put it in context, for a large health care corporation, a damage cap of $700,000 may 
be roughly the cost of one MRI machine. 
216 Paulson v. County of Pierce, 664 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Wash. 1983). 
217 I-330 may not apply to all members within the designated class, if that class is 
apprehended to include all living beings.  While our current state of jurisprudence is 
developing in the area of animal rights—the Washington State Bar Association has only 
within the last several years approved creation of an Animal Rights Section—it is worthy 
of note that the broad range of health care facilities subject to I-330 does not include 
veterinarians and veterinary hospitals.  Malpractice insurance for veterinarians has been 
the topic of at least one law review article. Gregg A. Scoggins, Legislation without 
Representation: How Veterinary Medicine Has Slipped through the Cracks of Tort 
Reform, 1990 U. ILL. L. Rev. 953 (1990).  There is no small irony in a world where 
animal rights find little jurisprudential protection, that a post-I-330 legal landscape would 
result in greater right to redress in “an injury or death as a result of health care services” 
affecting one’s pet than one’s person.  Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 2(3). 
218 Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Public Disclosure Comm’n, 4 P.3d 808, 
838 n.3 (Wash. 2000), quoting ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY, 75 (1917 ed.) (1894). 
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219 Paulson, 664 P.2d. at 1207. 
220 The deterrence arising from tort liability is most effective respecting prospective 
defendants who can take measures to assure that the standard of care is met in advance; 
the deterrence effect on prospective plaintiffs, even if they were sufficiently prescient to 
see themselves as future victims, would presumably be maximized by the natural, human 
desire to avoid pain, injury, and disability and alterations in tort liability would be 
unlikely to give rise to significant additional motivation for injury-avoidance. 
221 See Paulson, 664 P.2d at 1207.   
222 It is difficult not to suspect political motivations underlying this measure, which seeks 
to limit the liability of a traditionally Republican insurance industry while attacking the 
earnings of a traditionally Democratic plaintiff trial lawyers’ bar and burdening plaintiffs 
in their ability to secure counsel. 
223 Allard v. First Interstate Bank of Washington, N.A., 768 P.2d 998, 1005 (Wash. 
1989). 
224 Id. at 1006: “It should be noted at the outset that the contingent fee is the dominant 
system in the United States by which legal services are financed by those seeking to 
assert a claim.” 
225 Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5, 83 P.3d at 427. 
226 See Snure, supra note 213.  
227 See Studdert, supra note 86. 
228 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 21: “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, but the 
legislature may provide for a jury of any number less than twelve in courts not of record, 
and for verdict by nine or more judges in civil cases in any court of record, and for 
waiving of the jury in civil cases where the consent of the parties interested is given 
thereto.” 
229 Sofie, 771 P.2d at 724. 
230 Id. at 720. 
231 Id. at 716-17 (quoting James v. Robeck, 490 P.2d 878 (1971)). 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 718. 
234 Id. at 717 (citing Dacres v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 20 P. 601 (1889)). 
235 Id. at 722. 
236 See supra note 196.   
237 Hamilton v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 761 P.2d 618, 571 (Wash. 1988). 
238 Text of I-330, supra note 6, at § 2, ¶ 6.   
239 Hamilton, 761 P.2d at 572. 
240 Washington State Secretary of State, 2005 General Election: Official Vote Count, 
available at 
http://vote.wa.gov/election/2005/general/measures.aspx. 
241 Washington Network for Civil Justice and Accountability, 
http://www.no330.org/no330/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). 
242 Washington State Medical Association, Yes On I-330, available at 
http://www.yesoni330.org/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). 
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